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IMAGE  EVALUATION 
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Photographic 

Sciences 

Corporation 


23  WEST  MAIN  STREET 

WEBSTfeR.N.Y.  14580 

(716)  872-4503 


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CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/iCIVIH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


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> 


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10X  14X  18X  22X 


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12X 

16X 

20X 

24X 

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la  derniire  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
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Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparattra  sur  la 
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symbols  V  signifie  "FIN". 


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required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
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Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  Atre 
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TO 


THE  SOLDIERS  OF  THE  QUEEN 

IN  SOUTH  AFRICA 


THIS  HUMBLE  HPFORT  TO  PROVE  THEIR   COUNTRY'S 

CAUSE  NOT  UNWORTHY  OF  THEIR  VALOUR 

IS  AFFECTIONATELY  INSCRIBED 


NOTE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 


I  draw  attention,  with  double  satisfaction,  to  the  article  by  Captain 
A.  T.  Mahan,  U.  S.  N.,  in  The  North  American  Review  for  the 
present  month. 

It  is  extremely  gratifying  to  me  that  a  writer  of  Captain  Mahan's 
reputation,  and  moreover  an  American,  uses  precisely  the  same  data  and 
reaches  identically  the  same  conclusions  as  myself.  Having  neither 
literary  standing,  nor  prominence  in  any  other  way,  to  recommend  my 
effort  to  the  general  public,  the  support  of  Captain  Mahan's  article  is 
particularly  welcome. 

I  also  congratulate  myself  that  my  address  was  delivered  and 
printed  early  enough  to  relieve  me  of  the  suspicion  of  plagiarism. 

Although  Captain  Mahan  refers  liberally  to  the  ParHamentary 
Blue-Books  his  extracts  therefrom  are  necessarily  very  brief.  I,  on  the 
other  hand,  have  quoted  copiously  from  that  source,  which  encourages 
me  to  hope  that  this  pamphlet  may  be  found  by  many  a  useful  supplement 
to  Captain  Mahan's  article. 

This  pamphlet,  which  pretends  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  mere 
compilation  of  evidence  such  as  any  careful  student  might  make,  has  been 
printed  in  response  to  the  wish  of  a  number  of  American  citizens  who 
heard  the  address,  and  who  share  my  earnest  desire  for  the  most  cordial 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 

In  common  with  a  great  majority  of  my  countrymen  I  deeply 
regret  that  American  opinion  is  so  largely  unfavorable  to  England  upon 
the  South  African  question.  I  am  persuaded  that  this  arises  from  lack  of 
correct  information;  and  I  am  therefore  hopeful  that  in  presenting  the 
unquestionable  facts,  I  may  have  performed  a  slight  service  to  both 
countries.  No  intelligent  American  who  knows  the  truth  can,  I  am 
sure,  doubt  that  England's  success  will  be  in  the  interest  of  justice  and 
liberty  as  well  as  of  lasting  benefit  to  the  Boers  themselves. 

Should  the  reader  agree  with  these  remarks  I  trust  he  will  recom- 
mend the  pamphlet  to  his  friends,  a  hope  I  feel  at  liberty  to  express  inas- 
much as  no  pecuniary  advantage  will  accrue  to  myself. 


THE  AUTHOR. 


Walkerville,  Oxt.,  March,  igoo. 


INTRODUCTION. 


I  find  myself  to-night  in  a  position  which  calls  for  some  explana- 
tion. The  platform  is  not  my  sphere,  nor  have  I  any  inclination  for  it; 
much  less  do  I  presume  to  be  here  by  reason  of  any  weight  which  my 
opinions  may  carry.  I  stand  before  you,  against  my  own  wish,  from  a 
profound  sense  of  duty,  and  I  beg  your  indulgence  in  the  performance  of 
a  task  which  I  would  gladly  leave  in  abler  hands. 

Ever  since  hostilities  broke  out  in  South  Africa  I  have  been 
impressed  with  the  great  importance  of  a  proper  understanding  of  the 
subject  by  the  people  of  Canada,  and  particularly  on  this  border,  where, 
naturally,  we  are  more  or  less  influenced  by  the  views  entertained  by  our 
neighbors  across  the  river,  and  they  in  turn  to  some  extent  draw  conclu- 
sions from  what  they  see  and  hear  on  this  side.  As  it  became  more  and 
more  manifest  that  misconception  existed  in  both  communities,  I  made 
an  effort  to  induce  Dr.  Parkin,  (Principal  of  Upper  Canada  College,  and 
perhaps  second  to  none  as  an  authority  upon  Imperial  subjects),  whose 
eloquent  voice  not  long  ago  was  heard  in  this  hall,  to  pay  us  another 
visit.  I  used  every  argument  I  could  command  to  persuade  him  to  come; 
but  he  replied  that  it  was  absolutely  impossible  for  him  to  get  away. 

For  months  I  have  been  .studying  the  subject  for  my  own  satisfac- 
tion, and  among  other  things  I  have  obtained  the  British  Blue  Books 
thereon.  These,  as  many  of  you  know,  are  the  official  record,  containing 
the  despatches  on  both  sides.  They  are  absolutely  non-partisan,  because 
the  statements  and  arguments  of  the  Transvaal  are  printed  with  the  same 
fullness  and  accuracy  as  those  of  England.  They  are  consequently  free 
from  that  bias  which  is  apt  to  appear,  however  little  intended,  in  any 
other  narrative. 

In  the  course  of  conversation  a  number  of  my  friends  became 
aware  that  I  possessed  and  had  diligently  read  these  books.  Many  of 
them  found  therein  information  entirely  new  to  them;  several  confessed 
themselves  much  strengthened  thereby  in  their  previous  views;  and  others 
that  serious  doubts  formerly  entertained  were  entirely  removed,  to  their 
great  peace  of  mind. 

A  number  of  these  acquaintances  represented  to  me  that  it  was  in 
my  power  to  perform  a  public  service  by  making  known  in  a  more  general 
way  what  I  had  communicated  to  them  privately.  If  that  be  true,  as  I 
hope  it  is,  I  should  be  lacking  in  patriotism  if  I  hesitated  to  assume  the 
task  because  it  would  be  more  agreeable  to  my  feelings  to  sit  in  the 
audience  than  to  stand  where  I  now  am. 

It  may  be  thought  by  some  of  you  unnecessary  that  anything 
more  should  be  said  upon  a  subject  which  has  already  been  so  much 


i\ 


written  about.  There  are  books  upon  books  dealing  with  this  matter; 
and  the  magazine  articles  are  very  numerous.  But  the  difficulty  with 
these  is  that  the  reader  suspects  prejudice.  Against  the  views  of  one 
author  there  are  found  the  opposite  opinions  of  another.  They  differ 
greatly  even  in  their  statements  of  fact.  Moreover,  but  few  people  can 
pos.se.ss  themselves  of  this  mass  of  literature ;  and  fewer  still  would  be 
inclined  to  read  it  all. 

I  am  not  presumptuous  enough  to  add  my  mere  opinions  to  this 
already  large  list.  I  intend  to  present  for  your  consideration  facts  drawn 
from  the  fountain  head.  Some  remarks  of  my  own  I  must  of  necessity 
introduce  in  order  to  connect  the  selections  made  from  a  very  voluminous 
record.  My  chief  embarrassment  has  been  to  decide  what  to  omit. 
I  have  been  compelled  most  reluctantly  to  pass  over  a  great  deal  of  very 
important  matter,  but  I  can  say  with  truth  that  I  have  not  attempted  to 
conceal  anything  which  would  be  more  favorable  to  the  Boers  or  less 
favorable  to  the  British. 

I  wish  to  make  it  quite  clear  that  in  considering  the  present  situation 
we  have  no  right  to  go  behind  the  Agreement  of  1881.  Whatever  faults 
there  may  have  been  previous  to  that,  (and  I  have  no  doubt  there  were 
many  on  both  sides),  a  fresh  start  was  then  made.  A  great  deal  of 
sympathy  is  being  worked  up  for  the  Boers  in  connection  with  their 
migration  from  Cape  Colony  sixty  to  seventy  years  ago.  It  is  not  fair 
that  our  judgment  of  the  present  should  be  in  any  way  warped  by  the 
remote  past.  The  vendetta  has  no  place  in  modern  civilization.  What 
we  have  to  decide  is  whether  the  people  of  to-day  have  dealt  fairly  one 
with  another. 

I  also  want  to  make  it  absolutely  clear  that  neither  the  Boers 
nor  the  British  as  a  people  are  here  on  trial.  The  question  is  purely  one 
of  governments.  That  the  Boers  as  a  race  have  many  admirable  qualities 
no  fair-minded  Englishman  wishes  to  deny.  But,  however  much  good 
there  may  be  in  the  Boers  individually,  that  cannot  change  the  facts 
with  regard  to  President  Kruger,  who  admittedly  has  managed  things  his 
own  way  for  a  long  time,  nor  as  to  the  officials  by  whom  he  was  assisted. 
When,  therefore,  I  speak  of  the  Boers  unfavorably,  I  shall  mean  simply 
their  Government  at  Pretoria. 

The  hope  has  been  expressed  that  I  would  present  both  sides  of 
this  question  fairly.  If  that  were  not  my  intention  there  would  be  no 
excuse  for  my  taking  up  your  time.  I  shall  find  it  necessary  to  say  some 
rather  severe  things  about  the  conduct  of  the  Transvaal  Government  in 
this  controversy,  and  if  I  do  not  bring  out  anything  to  their  credit  it  is 
simply  because  I  have  been  absolutely  unable  to  find  anything.  I  say  in 
all  sincerity,  with  a  full  sense  of  my  responsibility,  that  the  official  and 
unimpeachable  history  of  their  part  in  these  negotiations  is  the  most 
amazing  chronicle  of  persistent  bad  faith  which  ever  came  under  my 
observation. 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR 


THE  merits  of  this  conflict  are  very  generally  misunderstood  by  liotli 
foreigners  and  our  own  people.  Considering  the  importance  of  the 
issue  to  the  world  at  large,  misconception  in  either  quarter  is  regrettable; 
but  in  view  of  its  special  and  enormous  significance  to  ourselves  it  is  in 
the  highest  degree  desirable  that  we  should  know  the  truth.  In  a  task 
which  perhaps  no  living  man  can  now  measure  it  would  be  deplorable, 
and  it  might  indeed  prove  a  calamity,  if  we  Britons  are  not  of  one  niiiul 
as  to  the  righteousness  of  our  cause.  The  South  African  situation  is  in 
itself  surrounded  by  many  grave  uncertainiies.  No  one  can  yet  tell  the 
extent  of  the  Boer  resources;  it  is  unknown  how  far  the  disloyalty  of  the 
Dutch  population  of  Cape  Colony  and  Natal,  (far  outnumbering  those  of 
British  extraction),  may  go;  there  is  the  ever  present  danger  from  the 
native  tribes,  who  are  thousands  to  hundreds  of  all  the  white  races  com- 
bined When  we  remember  further  that  besides  the  munitions  of  war 
even  the  food  for  men  and  horses  has  to  be  transported  at  least  seven  to 
eight  thousand  miles,  and  often  more,  it  must  be  seen  that  our  difficulties 
are  sufficiently  formidable.  vShould  there  be  added  to  these  Kuropean 
intervention,  (at  present  apparently  unlikely),  or  should  England  become 
involved  in  a  struggle  elsewhere,  any  half-heartedness  toward  this  con- 
test would  enormously  weaken  the  Government,  of  whatever  part>-,  and 
might  lead  to  the  acceptance  of  terms  which  the  nation  would  afterward 
bitterly  regret.  Moreover,  if  we  have  our  quarrel  just,  it  is  due  to  those 
in  London  who  carry  the  anxieties  of  the  situation,  and  to  those  brave 
fellows  who  are  gallantly  representing  us  in  the  field,  that  a  united  peo- 
ple should  be  at  their  backs,  promptly  providing  the  money  without 
which  no  war  can  be  carried  on  to  the  best  advantage,  and  cheerfully 
enduring  such  sacrifices  as  may  be  necessary  to  the  complete  success  of 
the  British  arms. 

I  have  friends,  good,  loyal  subjects,  whose  minds  are  di.squieted 
about  this  matter.  They  fear  that  our  rulers  have  not  acted  wisely;  that 
they  have  made  too  much  of  a  rather  small  difference  with  the  Transvaal. 
Some  there  are  who  even  believe  the  tale  of  our  enemies,  that  the  great- 
est and  richest  empire  on  the  globe  has  picked  a  quarrel  with  a  small 
community  of  peaceable  farmers  who  asked  only  to  be  left  in  quiet 
possession  of  their  few  square  miles  of  land.  Small  wonder  if  honest 
men  who  entertain  such  misgivings  are  ill  at  ease;  less  wonder  that  those 
not  of  our  nation  who  have  such  impressions  take  usio  task  on  the  street, 
in  public  meetings  and  through  the  press.  But  never  in  our  history  was 
there  less  warrant  for  any  of  these  things.  Only  a  knowledge  of  the  truth 
is  needed  to  satisfy  our  own  consciences,  to  reassure  our  questioning 


THK  TRANSVAAL   WAR. 


friends,  and  to  confute  those  enemies  of  England  who  revile  her  under  all 
circumslances.  To  me  it  seems  clear  that  \vc  have  rarely  gone  to  war 
with  equal  justification,  and  certainly  never  with  more.  I  do  not  mean 
that  the  gauntlet  was  actually  thrown  down  by  the  Transvaal.  I  am 
ready  to  admit  that  it  is  not  he  who  strikes  the  first  blow,  but  he  who 
renders  blows  necessary,  who  is  responsible  for  the  fight.  I  am  willing 
to  make  every  pos'iible  allowance  for  the  Boers;  and  after  that  is  done 
there  is  enough  and  to  .spare  to  prove  them  the  deliberate  aggressors. 

I  found  the  other  day  in  an  American  newspaper  an  article  con- 
demning our  war  in  Soith  Africa,  which  is  a  fair  example  ol  the  prevail- 
ing misconception  of  the  essential  facts.  The  article  is  really  friendly  to 
England  in  a  general  way,  which  makes  it  the  more  unfortunate  and  the 
more  mischievous  that  it  should  be  wrong  in  its  premises.  Let  me  quote 
a  portion  of  it: 

' '  Granted  the  worst  of  the  outlanders'  grievances  were 
"  true,  these  made  no  issue  justifying  war  after  the  conces- 
' '  sion  offered  by  Kruger,  if  they  ever  did.  And  the  issue  of 
"  paramountcy  was  set  up  after  the  war  was  inevitable.  It 
' '  will  be  remembered  to  the  end  of  time  that,  more  than 
"  a  century  after  the  American  revolution,  England  attempt- 
' '  ed  coercion  of  a  free,  civilized  and  .self-centred  people  where 
"that  was  unnecessary." 

It  would  be  impossible  for  this  well-meaning  writer  to  stray 
further  from  the  truth.  The  grievances  of  the  outlanders  would  have 
justified  war  at  any  time  during  many  years,  and  the  wonder  of  it  is  that 
they  were  endured  so  long  and  so  patiently.  The  concession  offered  by 
Kruger  was  no  concession,  and  he  knew  it  was  no  concession,  because  he 
attached  thereto  a  condition  which  had  no  relation  to  the  wrongs  of  the 
outlanders,  and  the  refusal  of  which  he  was  well  aware  was  certain.  So 
far  from  attempting  more  than  a  century  after  the  American  revolution  to 
coerce  a  free, civilized  and  self-centred  people,  England  is  contending  against 
ignorance,  bigotry  and  corruption  for  the  first  principles  of  freedom;  for 
free  .speech;  for  a  free  press;  for  the  equality  of  man;  for  the  fair  adminis- 
tration of  the  law;  for  the  political  doctrine  which  had  its  birth  in  the 
American  revolution,  "no  taxation  without  representation;"  and  last, 
but  not  least,  for  that  security  against  oppression  which  England  guar- 
antees to  her  children  wherever  they  may  be. 

The  difficulties  which  culminated  in  this  conflict  were  numerous  and 
frequent;  and,  unhappily,  it  seemed  impossible  to  end  them.  Most  of  the 
things  complained  of  would  not  have  happened,  and  such  questions  as  did 
arise  would  have  been  much  more  easy  to  adjust,  but  for  the  bitterness 
between  the  two  races.  Nothing  would  be  gained  now  by  discussing 
the  origin  of  the  Boer  ill-feeling  toward  the  English;  but  it  is  necessary 
to  note  its  existence,  because  in  these  later  years  it  has  unfortunately 
revived  with  most  disastrous  consequences.     There  seems  to  be  no  doubt 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR.  3 

that,  as  usual,  there  were  in  the  beginning  faults  on  both  sides,  and  we 
nefd  not  try  to  apportion  the  blame. 

In  1877  the  antipathy  of  the  Boers  had  so  far  died  out,  or  become 
donnant,  that  to  all  appearances  a  large  section  of  them  welcomed  annex- 
ation and  another  large  section  accepted  it  without  serious  resentment. 
Opinions  are  much  divided  regarding  the  wisdom  of  that  step  on 
Kngland's  part,  and  equally  so  as  to  its  subsequent  revocation.  But 
there  seems  to  be  no  question  that  the  country  was  in  a  bankrupt  con- 
dition, badly  demoralized  politically,  and  utterly  powerless  to  protect 
itself  against  the  hostile  natives.  The  then  President,  Mr.  Burgers, 
addressing  the  Volksraad  shortly  before  annexation  was  proclaimed, 
said:— 

"I  would  rather  be  a  policeman  under  a  strong 
"Government  than  the  President  of  such  a  State.  It  is  you 
•' — you  members  of  the  Raad  and  the  Boers  —  who  have 
"lost  the  country,  who  have  .sold  your  independence  for  a 
"drink.  You  have  ill-treated  the  natives,  you  have  shot 
"them  down,  you  have  .sold  them  into  .slavery,  and  now  you 
"have  to  pay  the  penalty." 

;|:  *  * 

"We  should  delude  ourselves  by  entertaining  the 
"hope  that  matters  would  mend  by-and-by.  It  would  only 
"be  .self  deceit.  I  tell  you  openly,  matters  are  as  bad  as 
"they  ever  can  be;  they  cannot  be  worse.  These  are  bitter 
"truths,  and  people  may  perhaps  turn  their  backs  on  me; 
"but  then  I  .shall  have  the  consolation  of  having  done  my 
"duty." 


"To-day  a  bill  for  /■i.ioo  was  laid  before  me  for 
".signature;  but  I  would  sooner  have  cut  off  my  right  hand 
"than  sign  that  paper,  for  I  have  not  the  slightest  ground 
"to  expect  that  when  that  bill  becomes  due  there  will  be  a 
"penny  to  pay  it  with." 

I  quote  also  a  few  lines  from  a  report  by  Sir  Bartle  Frere,  a  man 
whose  honesty  has,  I  believe,  never  been  questioned,  as  to  what  he  found 
more  than  two  years  later, 

"I  was  particularly  impressed  by  the  replies  of  a 
"very  fine  specimen  of  a  Boer  of  the  old  school.  He  had 
"been  six  wee.cs  in  an  English  prison,  daily  expecting  exe- 
'  'cution  as  a  rebel,  and  had  been  wounded  by  all  the  enemies 
"against  whom  his  countrymen  had  fought  —  English, 
'  'Zulus,  Basutos,  Griquas  and  Bushmen. 

"  'But,'  he  said,  '  that  was  in  the  days  of  my  youth 
"  'and  inexperience.  Had  I  known  then  what  I  know  now 
"  'I  would  never  have  fought  against  the  English,  and  I 


4  THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 

"  'will  never  fight  them  again.  Old  as  I  am,  I  would  now 
"  'gladly  turn  out  against  the  Zulus,  and  take  fifty  friends 
'"of  my  own  who  would  follow  me  anywhere;  but  I  dare 
"  'not  leave  my  home  till  assured  it  will  not  be  destroyed 
"  'and  my  property  carried  oflF  in  my  absence  by  the  men 
"  'who  call  me  REBEL,  because  I  will  not  join  them  against 
" 'the  Government.  My  wife,  brought  up  like  a  civilized 
"  'woman  in  the  Cape  '^^olony,  has  had  five  times  in  her  life 
' '  'to  run  from  the  house  and  sleep  in  the  veld  when  attacked 
"  'by  Zulus  and  Basutos.  One  of  our  twelve  sons  was  asse- 
"  'gaied  in  sight  of  our  house,  within  the  last  ten  years,  by 
'"a  marauding  party;  and  in  my  absence  from  the  house, 
"'when  it  was  surrounded  by  Basutos,  my  wife  had  to  fly 
"'in  the  night  by  her.=elf,  leading  one  child  and  carrying 
"'another  on  her  back.  She  walked  nearly  fifty  miles 
"'thro:  '  -^  Lion  Veld,  seeing  three  lions  on  the  way, 

"  'befc  cached  a  place  of  safety.     It  is  not  likely  that 

" 'we  s..  orget  such  things,  nor  wish  them  to  recur; 

''  'but  ho\v  can  I  leave  her  on  my  farm  and  go  to  Zululand 
"'when  the  malcontent  leaders  threaten  me  that  if  I  go 
"'they  will  burn  my  house  and  drive  off  all  my  stock? 
"  'Assure  me  that  we  are  not  to  be  deserted  by  the  English 
" 'Government,  and  left  to  the  mercy  of  these  malcontent 
"  'adventurers,  and  I  and  my  people  will  gladly  turn  out  to 
"  'assist  Colonel  Wood.'  " 

And  later,  when  the  war  of  independence  was  over,  Mr.  Thomas 
Fortescue  Carter,  in  his  book  "A  Narrative  of  the  Boer  War,"  which  is 
by  no  means  complimentary  to  the  motives  of  the  British  Government, 
thus  describes  the  attitude  of  the  Boers  toward  annexation: 

"Anyone  who  knows  the  acquaintance  Sir  T.  Sliep- 
".stone  had  with  the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal,  years  prior  to 
"the  atniexation,  cannot  doubt  that,  regarded  as  a  friend 
"and  almost  as  one  of  themselves,  no  one  better  than  he 
"could  have  been  selected  for  the  task  of  ascertaining  the 
"desires  of  the  people;  and  no  one  who  knows  vSir  T.  Shep- 
"stone  will  believe  that  he  did  not  take  sufficient  evidence 
"to  prove  to  any  man  that  the  Boers  were  anxious  to  be 
"extricated  from  the  dilemma  they  were  in,  and  really  wil- 
"ling  at  that  time  that  their  country  should  be  annexed. 
"Men  who  during  the  late  war  were  our  foes  were  at  the 
"time  of  the  annexation  clamouring  for  it,  welcoming  Sir 
"Theophilus  Shepstone  as  the  Deliverer  and  Saviour  of  the 
"country. 

"The  natural  aversion  of  the  people  to  English  rule 
"was  overcome  for  the  moment  by  their  greater  aversion  to 


/ 


THE  TRANSVAAL   WAR.  5 

"being  wiped  off  the  face  of  the  Transvaal  by  the  blacks; 
"that  was  a  contingency  staring  them  in  the  face,  and  yet 
"not  even  that  imminent  common  danger  availed  to  secure 
"unity  amongst  tl  jm,  or  would  rouse  men  individually  to 
"take  upon  their  shoulders  the  responsibility  which  rests 
"upon  every  member  of  a  state." 

There  were  then,  as  now,  crafty  and  designing  men  ready  to  work 
upon  the  simple  minds  of  the  Boers,  to  revive  their  slumbering  dislike  of 
the  British  and  to  play  upon  their  deep  love  of  independence.  Unfortun- 
ately the  great  majority  of  them  were  then,  as  they  are  still,  very  ignorant; 
and,  unfortunately  lOO,  certain  promises  made  by  England  when  she 
annexed  the  country  were  not  carried  out  as  promptly  as  expected.  This 
did  not  result  from  any  bad  faith,  but  from  the  fact  that  just  then  Sir 
Bartle  Frere  found  his  hands  full  with  many  matters  which  might  well 
appear  to  him  much  more  urgent,  as  described  in  that  admirable  book, 
"The  Transvaal  From  Within,"  as  follows:  — 

"The  failure  to  fulfill  promises  was  not  deliberate. 
"Circumstances  combined  to  prevent  Sir  Bartle  Frere  from 
"visiting  the  Transvaal,  as  intended  and  promised.  Native 
"wars,  disagreements  between  the  Colonial  and  Imperial 
"authorities,  the  obstructions  and  eventual  dismissal  of  the 
"Molteno-Merriman  Ministry,  Natal  and  Diamond-fields 
"afifairs,  and,  above  all,  the  Zulu  War,  all  combined  to  pre- 
"vent  Sir  Bartle  Frere  from  fulfilling  his  obligations  to  set- 
"tle  Transvaal  matters." 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  unlucky  for  both  races  than  what 
then  took  place.  The  Boers,  forgetting  the  enormous  benefits  which  they 
had  so  lately  reaped  from  the  British  occupation,  (whatever  might  be  said 
for  or  against  it  in  the  long  run),  suddenly  took  up  arms  against  the 
very  few  British  soldiers  then  in  the  country,  whom  by  superior  numbers 
and  skill  with  the  rifle  they  defeated. 

Shortly  came  the  disaster  of  Majuba  Hill;  then  the  armistice, 
resulting  in  the  restoration  of  independence  to  the  Transvaal,  subject  to 
British  suzerainty,  under  an  agreement  known  as  "The  Convention  of 
1881."  A  second  Convention  was  made  in  1884;  and  the  dispute  which 
is  now  being  decided  by  the  .sword  has  to  do  with  those  two  documents. 
Except  as  to  its  influence  upon  the  temper  of  the  parties  to  these  agree- 
mems,  nothing  that  went  before  has  any  bearing  upon  the  rights  or 
wrongs  of  this  war.  I  have  referred  to  the  annexation  because  it  explains 
the  revival  of  bad  feeling,  and  also  because  in  many  quarters  it  is  charged 
against  England  as  an  unwarranted  aggression. 

It  is  both  impossible  and  unnecessary  here  to  consider  all  the 
many  differences  which  have  arisen  under  these  Conventions,  whether 
settled  or  unsettled,  because  two  are  recognized  by  both  combatants  as 
pre-eminent.     They  are: 


6  THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 

(i)    The  alleged  grievances  of  British  subjects  in  the  Transvaal; 
(2)     The  English  claim  of  suzerainty; 
which  we  will  consider  in  the  above  order 


THE    ALLEGED    GRIEVANCES    OF    BRITISH 
SUBJECTS  IN  THE  TRANSVAAL. 

Our  fellow-subjects  were  continuously  complaining  of  gross  injus- 
tice, and  there  is  no  denial,  except  by  the  Boers  themselves,  (and  not 
by  all  of  tbera),  that  these  complaints  were  abundantly  well  founded  and 
of  long  duration.  Neither  does  it  seem  possible  to  deny  that  the  condition 
of  these  people  grew  steadily  worse  instead  of  better. 

So  much  has  been  written  on  this  subject  that  it  can  scarcely  be 
necessary  to  go  into  details.  I  will  only  ((note  from  the  report  of  a 
speech  made  in  the  Volksraad  in  August,  1895,  by  a  Boer  member,  Mr. 

Jeppe  : 

"Who  are  the  people  who  now  demand  from  us  a 
'  'reasonable  extension  of  the  franchise  ?  There  are,  to  begin 
"with,  almost  a  thousand  old  burghers  who  consent  to  such 
"extension.  There  are  in  addition  eight  hundred  and  ninety 
"petitioners,  also  old  burghers,  who  complain  that  the 
"franchise  has  been  narrowed  by  recent  legislation,  and  there 
"is  lastly  a  monster  petition  bearing  35,700  names,  chiefly 
"from  the  Rand  goldfields  ;  and  iii  passing  I  may  mention 
'  'that  I  have  convinced  myself  that  the  signatures  to  it,  with 
"very  few  exceptions  perhaps,  are  undoubtedly  genuine. 
"Well,  this  petition  has  been  practically  signed  by  the  entire 
"ixjpulation  of  the  Rand.  There  are  not  three  hundred 
"people  of  any  .standing  whose  names  do  not  appear  there. 
"  *  *  *  It  embraces  also  all  nationalities  ;  they  all 
"have  signed  it.  So  have— and  that  is  significant — old 
"burghers  from  the  Free  State,  whose  fathers  with  yours 
"reclaimed  this  country;  and  it  bears  too  the  signatures  of 
"some  who  have  been  born  in  this  country,  who  know  no 
"other  fatherland  than  this  Repuljlic,  but  whom  the  law 
"regards  as  strangers.  Throv.gh  our  own  act  this  multitude 
"is  compelled  to  stand  together,  and  .so  to  stand  in  this  mo.st 
"fatal  of  all  questions  in  antagonism  tons.  *  *  * 
"Shall  we  convert  them  into  friend.s,  or  shall  we  .send  them 
"away   empty,     dis.satisfied,    embittered?  *  *         * 

"Well,  should  we  resolve  now  to  refuse  this  request,  what 
"will  we  do  when,  as  we  well  know  must  happen,  it  is 
"repeated  V)y  two  hundred  thousand  one  day?  You  will  all 
"admit  the  doors  must  be  opened.     What  will  become  of  us 


ir* 


THE  TRANSVAAL   WAR.  7 

"or  our  children  on  that  day  when  we  shall  find  ourselves 
"in  a  minority  of  perhaps  one  in  twenty,  without  a  single 
"friend  amongst  the  other  nineteen,  amongst  those  who  will 
"then  tell  us  they  wished  to  be  brothers,  but  that  we  by  our 
'  'own  act  made  them  strangers  to  the  Republic  ?   Old  as  the 
"world  is,  has  an  attempt  like  ours  ever  succeeded  for  long  ? 
"Shall  we  say  as  a  French  king  did  that  things  will  last  our 
"time,  and  after  that  we  reck  not  the  deluge  ?" 
The  request  of  the  petitioners  was  refused  by  a  vote  of  sixteen  to 
eight.     The  President  several  times  spoke  against  the  petition,  and  one 
member  is  reported  thus  : 

"The  Raad  had  frequently  heard  that  if  the  fran- 
"chise  were  not  extended  there  would  be  trouble  ;  he  would 
'  'say  'Come  on  and  fight  !  Come  on  !  Come  on  and  have 
"it  out ;  and  the  sooner  the  better  ! '  " 

And  so  the  Outlanders,  seeing  no  other  hope,  got  ready  for  the 
fight,  which,  however,  they  trusted  would  be  avoided  when  the  Govern- 
n  ent  saw  that  they  were  determined.  They  laid  in  arms  and  prepared 
for  a  movement  at  the  end  of  the  year.  But  the  Jameson  raid— a  most 
deplorable  act  for  the  Outlanders  and  all  South  Africa— spoiled  their 
plans.  The  raiders  were  captured  ;  the  Government  had  prepared  itself  ; 
and  the  outcome  of  the  whole  matter  was  that  at  the  request  of  the 
British  High  Conunissioner,  and  upon  plausible  promises  by  President 
Kruger,  the  Outlanders  gave  up  their  arms. 

The  President's  promises  were  not  kept,  and  matters  continued  in 
a  most  unsettled  and  dangerous  condition  until  May,  1899,  when,  at 
the  instance  of  President  Steyn,  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  it  was  arranged 
that  President  Kruger  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  British  High  Commissioner, 
should  meet  at  Bloemfontein  with  a  view  to  finding  some  friendly  solution 
of  the  difficulty,  which  by  this  time  had  been  rendered  acute  by  a  petition 
to  Her  Majesty  from  21,000  of  her  subjects  setting  forth  their  wrongs  and 
appealing  for  that  protection  which  is  the  birthright  of  every  man  who 
owes  allegiance  to  the  Union  Jack. 

President  Kruger,  accompanied  by  two  members  of  his  executive 
Council,  the  Transvaal  State  Attorney  and  other  officials,  met  Sir  Alfred 
Milner  on  May  31st  last,  when  it  was  agreed  that  Mr.  Fi.scher,  a  member 
of  the  KxecuUve  Council  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  should  act  as  inter- 
preter, which  he  did  throughout. 

At  the  request  of  President  Kruger,  Sir  Alfred  Milner  opened  the 
conversation.  I  quote  his  exact  words  because  it  is  desirable  when  pos- 
sible to  follow  that  course,  and,  moreover,  neither  I,  nor,  I  think,  any 
other  man,  could  hope  to  find  language  more  convincingly  expressive  of 
the  sincerest  desire  for  a  friendly  settlement  and  to  avoid  asking  any 
thing  which  could  be  reasonably  objected  to  by  the  Boers. 
Sir  Alfred  Milner  said  : 

''It  is  my  strong  conviction  that  if  the   Government  of 


8 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


''the  South  African  Republic  wuld  now,  before  things  get  worse, 
''of  its  own  motion  change  its  policy  towards  the  Uitlanders,  and 
"take  measures  calculated  to  content  the  reasonable  people 
"among  them,  who,  after  all,  are  a  great  majority,  such  a 
'  'course  ivould  not  only  strengthen  the  independence  of  the  Re- 
"public,  but  it  -uwild  make  such  a  better  state  of  feeling  all 
"round  that  it  would  become  fat  easier  to  settle  outstanding 
"questions  between  the  two  Governments. 

"Iknorv  that  the  citizens  of  the  South  African  Republic 
"are  intensely  jealous  of  British  interference  in  their  internal 
"affairs.  What  I  want  to  impress  upon  the  President  is  that 
''if  the  Government  of  the  South  African  Republic  of  its  own 
"accord,  from  its  own  sense  of  policy  and  justice,  would  afford 
"a  more  liberal  treatment  to  the  Uitlander  population  this 
"would  not  increase  British  interference,  but  enormously  dimin- 
'  'ish  it.  If  the  Uitlanders  were  in  a  position  to  help  themselves 
"they  would  not  always  be  appealing  to  us  under  the  Conven- 
"tion." 

President  Kruger  having  raised  the  point  that  the  old  burghers 
might  he.  outvoted,  Sir  Alfred  replied  : 

"If  I  made  a  proposal  to  admit  strangers  under  such 
"conditions  as  to  swamp  the  old  burghers  it  would  be  unrea- 
"sonable.  But  the  new-comers  have  at  present,  no 
"influence  on  the  legislation  of  the  Republic,  which  makes 
"an  enormous  difference.     They  haven't  got  a  single  repre- 

"sentative." 

President  Kruger  proposed  to   shorten  the  period  necessary   fur 
obtaining  the  franchise,  to  which  Sir  Alfred  replied  : 

"There  are  a  great  many  objections  of  the  gravest 
"kind  to  the  process  by  which  men  may  now  obtain  burgher 
"rights.  Fust  of  all,  before  he  can  begin  the  process  of 
"gradually  securing  burgher  rights— which  will  be  com- 
"pletcd  in  14  years  at  present,  and  in  9  years  according  to 
"the  President— he  has  to  forswear  his  own  allegiance. 
"Take  the  case  of  a  British  subject,  which  interests  me 
"most.  fie  takes  the  oath  and  ceases  to  be  a  British 
"subject  hv  the  mere  fact  of  taking  that  oath;  he  loses 
"all  the  rights  of  a  British  subject,  and  he  would  still  have  to 
"wait  for  twelve  years,  and  under  the  new  plan  seven  years, 
"before  he  can  become  a  full  citizen  of  the  Republic. 

"I  think  it  is  unreasonable  to  ask  a  man  to  forswear 
"one  citizenship  unless  in  the  very  act  of  giving  up  one  he 
"gets  another,  and  I  think  it  is  also  unnecessary  to  ask  him 
"to  do  more  than  take  an  oath  of  fealty  to  the  new  State, 
"of  willingness  to  obey  its  laws  and  to  defend  its  indepen- 
"dence,  when  it  is  known  and  certain  that  the  taking  of  that 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 

"oath  deprives  him  of  his  existing  citizenship.  I  think  the 
"oath  should  be  a  simple  oath  of  allegiance,  and  that  it 
"should  not  be  required  of  a  man  until  the  moment  he  can 
"get  full  rights  in  a  new  State.  Now  that  was  the  position 
"under  the  law  of  1882.         *        *        * 

"As  for  the  period  required  to  qualify  for  the  full 
"franchise,  I  do  not  see  why  the  length  of  time  should  be 
"longer  in  the  South  African  Republic  than  in  any  other 
"South  African  State.     They  are  all  new  countries.    In  the 
"new  country  which  is  springing  up  in  the  north,  and  which 
"is  getting  a  new  Constitution  this  year,  the  period  is  one 
"year.     The  people  who  have  conquered  that  country  for 
"the  white  race  may  find  that  the  new-comers  are  more 
"numerous  than  they  are.    But  I  do  not  expect  that  anything 
''like  that  will  be  done  in  the  Sonth  African  Republic;    some- 
" thing  far  short  of  that  would  be  reasonable.     What  I  do 
"think  and  desire,  and  that  is  the  object  of  my  suggestion, 
"is  this:    that  the  numerous  foreign  population  engaged  in 
"commerce  and  industry  —  to  which  the  country,  after  all, 
"owes  its  present  great  position  in  wealth  and  influence  — 
"should  have  a  real  .share  in  tlie  Government  of  the  Repub- 
"\\c,  7tot  to  over- rule  the  old  burghers— not  at  a//  — but  to 
"share    the    work    of    Government    with    them,    so    that 
"through  their  gradual  co-operation  a  time  may  come  when, 
"instead  of  being  divided  into  two  separate  com mimities,  they 
"will  all  be  burghers  of  the  same  State.    It  is  not  enough  that 
"a  few  people  should  be  let  in.    It  is  obvious,  however,  that 
"you  could  not  let  in  the  whole  crowd,  without  character 
"or  anything  —  I  do  not  ask  it  —  but  you  want  such  a  sub- 
"stantial  measure  that  in  elections  of  members  of  the  Volks-' 
"raad  the  desires  of  the  new  industrial  population  should 
"have  reasonable  consideration.    They  have  not  got  it  now, 
"and  when  the  questions  that  interest  them  come  before  the 
"Volksraad  it  is  too  evident  that  they  are  discussed  from  an 
"outside  point  of  view.       The  industrial  population  are 
"regarded  as  strangers.     I  have  not  the  least  doubt  that  the 
"laws  that  are  made  appear  best  to  the  people  that  make 
"them,  but  it  is  the  universal  opinion  of  free  and  progres- 
"sive  nations  that  laws  are  best  made  by  people  who  have 
"to  obey  them,  and  not  by  people  outside.     The  whole  of 
"the  legislation  of  the  Raad  ".nay  be  good  or  may  be  bad, 
"but  the  laws  are  made  bv  vhe  Raad  for  people  who  have 
"no  voice  in  the  Raad,'-        who  in  their  view  of  things, 
"their  .sentiments  and  sympathies,   are  widely  separated 
"from  them,  and  that,  in  my  opinion,  makes  the  people  dis- 
'  'contented.     It  would  make  all  the  difference  in  th  -.  world 


lO 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


"if,  when  laws  are  discussed  affecting  the  new  population, 
"some  representatives  of  the  new  population  should  be 
"present  to  explain  the  views  and  wishes  of  that  population 
"from  the  ?;«/</^,  not  from  the  outside.         *        *        * 

^^I do  not  7('(nit  to  s-Wiunp  the  old  population,  but  it  is 
'^perfectly  possible  to  give  the  new  populatio^i  an  immediate 
^'voice  in  the  legislation,  and  yet  to  leave  the  old  bin ghers  in 
^'sueh  a  position  that  they  cannot  possibly  be  sivamped." 
The   President  protested  that  to  adopt  Sir  Alfred's  suggestions 
would  destroy  the  independence  of  the  Transvaal,  and  Sir  Alfred  con- 
tinued: — 

''As  to  the  question  of  the  independence  of  the  country 
"I  remain  firmly  convinced  that  the  things  I  am  urging  upon 
'Hhc  President  arc  calculated  to  sfrcngthcii  it.  Of  course  I 
"may  fail  to  convince  the  President  of  that,  but  I  protest 
''absolutely  against  the  vie~wthat  he  is  defending  the  indcpend- 
"ence  of  his  country  and  I  'icish  to  take  it  a7i<ay.  What  makes 
"this  whole  discussion  so  difficult  is  the  intense  prejudice  ou  the 
"side  of  the  present  burghers,  and  their  intense  suspicion  of  us. 
"They  think  Her  Majesty's  Government  wants  to  get  their 
"country  back  in  one  way  or  another.  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 
"ernment  does  not;  but  what  it  does  desire  is  that  it  should 
"have  such  a  state  of  rest  in  the  country  as  will  remove 
"causes  of  friction  and  diificulty  between  the  Republic  and 
"Her  Majesty's  possessions  in  South  Africa,  and  the  whole 
"of  the  British  Empire,  and  ray  suggestions  here  are  directed 
"to  that  end.  I  do  not  want  to  say  it  over  and  over  again; 
"I  say  it  once  for  all." 

After  some  discussion  of  the  existing  laws,  the  following  dialogue 
took  place: 

President. — "I  would  now  like  His  Excellency  to  propose  a 

"scheme." 
Sir  Ali'REd. — "There  are  two  things  I  have  to  consider.  / 
"have  got  to  consider  the  prejudices  of  the  old  burghers.  I 
"know  that  even  if  I  were  to  convince  the  President  him- 
"selflie  might  have  difficulty  in  convincing  other  people; 
'  'therefore  I  must,  in  proposing  anything,  propose  .something 
"which  it  can  be  made  absolutely  clear  to  the  old  burghers 
"will  not  swamp  them.  On  the  other  hand  I  have  to  con- 
"sider  that  it  is  perfectly  useless  to  propose  something  which 
"will  give  no  satisfaction  whatever  to  the  reasonable  desires 
"of  the  new  population,  which  may  be  rejected  at  once  as 
"totally  insufficient,  the  whole  object  of  the  proposal  being  to 
"give  them  such  an  amount  of  satisfaction  as  -will  bring  them 
"ott  to  the  side  of  the  State,  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  it,  and  to 
"work    in  future    -with    the    old    burghers   as  one  people. 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


XI 


"Bearing  these  things  in  mind,  what  I  suggest  is  this  ;  that 
"every  foreigner  who  can  prove  satisfactorily  that  he  has 
"been  resident  in  the  country  for  five  years,  and  that  he 
"desires  to  make  it  his  permanent  place  of  residence,  that 
"he  is  prepared  to  take  the  oath  to  obey  the  laws,  to  under- 
"take  all  the  obligations  of  citizenship,  and  to  defend  the 
"independence  of  the  country,  should  be  allowed  to  become 
'  'a  citizen  on  taking  that  oath.  This  should  be  confined  to 
"persons  possessing  a  certain  amount  of  property,  or  a 
"certain  amount  of  yearly  wages,  and  who  have  good 
"characters.  In  order  to  make  that  proposal  of  any  real 
"use  for  the  new  citizens,  who  mostly  Hve  in  one  district  in 
"the  Republic,  and  a  district  which  only  returns  one  mem- 
"ber  in  28  to  the  First  Raad,  and  one  in  2S  to  the  Second 
"Raad,  I  propose  that  there  should  be  a  certain  number  of 
"new  constituencies  created,  the  number  of  which  is  a 
"detail  upon  the  discussion  of  which  I  will  not  now  enter. 
*'BHt  what  IS  vital  fro7n  my  point  of  vinv  is  that  the  number 
^^ of  these  districts  should  not  be  so  small  as  to  leave  the  repre- 
"scntativt's  of  the  new  population  in  a  contemptible  minority.''' 
The  foregoing  brings  us  only  to  the  morning  session  of  the 
second  day.  The  meetings  extended  over  five  days,  and  during  the  suc- 
ceeding sessions  the  following  was  said: 

Sir  Alfred. — ''If  the  President  thinks  that  my  proposal  is 
^^goinij;  to  sivamp  the  old  burghers,  I  have  told  him  that  this 
''would  not  be  reasonable,  and  I  do  not  desire  it     '^      ^       * 

"I  fully  sympathise  with  you  in  not  wishing  to  give 
"a  share  in  the  privileges  of  the  country  to  people  who  only 
'  'come  for  a  short  time. 

"There  are  a  number  of  points  outstanding  be- 
"tween  the  Governments  independently  of  the  position 
"of  the  grievances  of  the  British  subjects  in  the  South 
"African  Republic.  There  are  a  number  of  other  points 
"arising  out  of  the  complaints  of  the  British  subjects 
"on  internal  affairs.  As  far  as  the.se  latter  points  are  con- 
"cerned  I  hope  that  it  may  not  be  necessary  to  discuss  them, 
"becau.se  the  moment  that  the  people  tvho  raise  these  complaints 
"are  put  in  a  position  to  fight  their  own  battles  within  the 
''State  I  shall,  with  Joy  and  delight,  say  to  them  if  they  raise 
'"complaints:  '■You.  arc  burghers  of  that  State;  you  have  no 
"  'right  to  complain  to  me;  you  must  fight  your  ozvn  battles.^ 
' '  There  arc  a  lot  of  questions  which  would  drop  if  7ve  could  come 
"to  an  agreement  on  this. 

"The  ground  on  which  I  approach  the  question  of  the 
'  'Uitlanders'  grievances  and  my  proposal  as  regards  the  f  ran- 


13 


THE  TRANwSVAAL  WAR. 


"chise  is  the  existence  of  grievances  and  discontent  which 
"has  lasted  for  years,  which  shows  no  signs  of  diminution, 
"the  existence  of  which  is  a  danger  to  the  Republic,  is  a 
"danger  to  the  good  relations  between  the  President  and 
"Her  Majesty's  Government:  and  which,  on  the  merits  of 
"that  question  alone,  I  contend  ought  to  be  dealt  with.  I  put 
"forward  a  suggestion  as  to  one  way  in  which  it  might  be 
"dealt  with,  and  I  should  be  glad  to  hear  before  we  go  any 
"further  what  the  President  has  to  say  about  that  pro- 
"posal.         *         *         * 

"If  the  President  tells  me  his  view  about  it  we  may 
"agree;  if  we  cannot,  then  I  shall  begin  to  feel  rather  hope- 
"less  about  the  outcome  of  the  whole  Conference.  But  still 
"if  a  way  could  be  shown  me  to  give  the  Uitlander  population 
"a  better  position  as  regards  the  management  of  their  own 
''affairs  -without  the  franehisc,  then  I  ant  prepared  to  consider 
''it.  *  *  *  But,  of  course,  I  do  not  contemplate 
"for  a  moment  that  if  that  extenuon  of  the  franchise  is  given 
'' Her  Majesty  s  Government  should  interfere  in  constitutional 
^'questions  in  the  South  African  Republic.  *         *         * 

"The  moment  you  give  these  people  a  really  substantial  posi- 
"tion  inside  the  State,  always  providing  again.st  their  swamp- 
"ing  the  whole  population,  then  they  will  have  less  tempta- 
"tion  to  appeal  to  outside,  and  not  only  Her  Majesty  s 
''Government,  but  all  fair-minded  people,  zc  ill  say  that  they 
'  'ought  not  to  appeal  outside. ' ' 

President. — "But  can  His  Excellency  not  understand  that 
"if  /  should  give  in  to  what  he  proposes  they  get  self-control, 
"and  then  I 'would  be  practically  giving  my  land  away  *  *  * 
"If  it  were  not  tliat  these  new-comers  are  perpetually 
"appealing  to  outside  they  would  have  by  this  time  been 
"burghers  amongst  us,  for  that  is  the  principle  we  started 
"on." 

Sir  Alfred. — "Surely  those  people  were  agitating  for  years 
"within  the  State  first  of  all." 

President. — "Only  on  account  of  the  support  from  outside. 
'  'They  were  always  seeking  for  help  from  outside.  I  want 
'  'to  allay  race  feeling,  and  if  they  had  not  continually  gone 
"outside  they  would  have  been  incorporated  among  the 
"burghers.  It  is  the  inroad  of  Rhodes  that  has  caused  the 
"difficulty  in  not  giving  them  rights." 

Sir  Alfred. — "Really,  as  an  historical  fact,  the  agitation 
"went  on  for  four  or  five  years  before  it  was  taken  up  by 
"Rhodes  or  any  of  the  capitalists.  In  fact,  the  reformers 
"were  abusing  the  capitalists."       ***** 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


U 


President. — "I  have  already  said  yesterday,  and  I  repeat., 

"that  the  proposition  made  by  His  Excellency   I  cannot 

"agfree  to,  but  we  are  still  considering  how  far  we  can  meet 

"him  and  come  nearer  and  nearer.     I  have  to  consider  ray 

"Volksraad  and  my  burghers,  and  if  I  have  to  go  back  and 

"convince  them  on  matters  I  must  tell  them  that  something 

"has  been  given  in  to  me  if  I  give  in  to  something"     *    * 

At  this  point  the  President  endeavoured  to  introduce  a  number  of 

other  subjects,  notwithstanding  that  he  had  invited  Sir  Alfred  to  open 

the  discussion,  and  fhe  one  question  Sir  Alfred  had  presented  as  that 

which  in  his  judgment  was  the  most  vital,  and  the  settlement  of  which 

he  believed  would  pave  the  way  for  an  amicable  understanding  all  round, 

had  not  been  progressed  at  all.       In  fact,  Mr.  Kruger  tried  to  drive  a 

bargain,  holding  out  the  expectation  of  something  being  done  for  the   Uit- 

landers  if  Sir  Alfred  would  concede  to  him  on  points  in  zvhich  the  Uitlandcrs 

had  no  interest.    Sir  Alfred  took  the  ground  that  the  Uitlander  grievances 

should  be  dealt  with  on  their  merits;  in  other  words,  that  if  there  were 

injustice  it  should  be  redressed  because  it  was  injustice,  as  a  matter  of 

conscience  on  the  part  of  the  Transvaal  and  because  the  dissatisfaction 

existing  was  detrimental  to  the  Transvaal  itself. 

The  discussion  proceeded  upon  these  lines,  the  President  urging 
strenuously  that  consideration  of  franchise  reform  should  be  conditional 
upon  concessions  on  the  other  points,  and  Sir  Alfred  maintaining  that 
each  proposal  should  be  considered  upon  its  merits,  but  with  the  assur- 
ance that  if  they  could  agree  upon  the  question  which  he  regarded  as  the 
key  to  the  whole  situation  he  would  do  everything  in  his  power  to  bring 
about  a  settlement  of  the  whole  controversy.  Finally  it  came  down  to 
this:  — 

President. — "I  have  said  already  I  wish  to  meet  His  Excel- 
"lency  as  far  as  possible  in  his  proposal  about  the  franchise. 
««  *  *  *  His  Excellency  has  not  got  any  nearer  in  the  matter 
"of  Swaziland,  or  in  the  matter  of  the  Indemnity,  and  on 
"the  point  of  Arbitration.  But  if  he  loill  not  come  nearer  to 
";«<?  on  these  three  points  I  should  get  nothitig  by  coming  to 
"an  agreement  on  the  point  of  the  franchise.''^ 
Sir  Alfred. — "However  much  I  may  desire  to  come  to  a 
"settlement  about  this  question  of  the  position  of  the  Uit- 
"lander  population,  I  will  not  buy  such  a  settlement.  I  am 
"convinced  that  it  is  very  much  in  the  President's  interest, 
"more  in  his  interest  to  get  it  settled.  I  consider  the 
'  'present  position  to  be  an  absolute  danger  for  the  South 
"African  Republic. 

"I  came  down  here,  and  my  main  object  was  to  dis- 
"cuss  this  Uitlander  question,  and  I  have  not  put  forward 
"proposal?  in  my  interest  any  more  than  in  the  President's. 
"I  decline  to  accept  the  basis  lie  proposes  that  I  should  buy 


14 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


"a  just  settlement  which  is  as  much  in  his  interest  as  in 
"mine.  On  the  other  hand,  I  quite  agfree  that  it  is  common 
"interest  also  that  there  should  be  a  system  of  settling  future 
"differences  between  us,  that  it  should  not  be  a  perpetual 
"case  of  'I  say  this,  and  you  say  that,'  and  that  nothing 
"should  settle  it  but  war  —  that  is  common  interest  too — 
"and  on  this  footing  I  am  willing  to  consider  the  question, 
"but  not  to  exchange  the  two  things  one  for  the  other;  that 
"is  a  sor'  "^f  Kaffir  bargain.     *     *    * 

^^ I  have  come  down  here  at  a  time  of  crisis  in  order  to 
"see  if  one  big,  straii^htfonvard  effort  mi}>ht  not  be  made  to 
"avert  a  great  disaster,  such  as  an  open  breach  beticeen  the  tzao 
"Governments,  and  I  claim  that  a  proposal  I  have  made  to 
"that  eflfect  should  be  discussed  on  its  merits.  If  agreement 
"is  not  possible  on  that  point,  then  everything  else  is  waste  of 
"time;  if  it  is  possible,  then  I  -will  do  everything  in  my  power 
"to  remove  other  difficulties  out  of  the  way,  and  I  will  be  en,' 
*^S'^S'^(l  '"  ^h<^t  work  while  the  President  is  engaged  in  obtain- 
"ing  the  approval  of  his  burghers  to  the  plan  on  which  we  both 
'  'agree  —  if  we  agree.     *     *     * 

"When  we  come  back  I  must  ask  the  President 
"whether  he  is  willing  to  go  into  the  question  which  I  have 
"propounded." 

President. — "Possibly  yes  and  possibly  no;  but  I  will  con- 
"sider  and  tell  His  Excellency  this  afternoon  at  two  o'clock. 
"If  His  Excellency  doesn't  want  to  go  into  any  point  but 
"the  franchise  it  will  not  be  my  fault  if  we  do  not  agree." 

Sir  Alfred.— "I  am  not  asking  the  President's  adoption  of 
"my  proposal,  but  for  the  expression  of  his  opinion,  and  to 
"goon  with  that  subject  until  we  have  settled  it  one  way 
"or  the  other,  because  if  that  doesn't  succeed  nothing  else 
"is  of  any  use." 

At  the  next  meeting,  (the  same  afternoon),  the  President  produced 
an  elaborate  franchise  scheme,  the  principal  provisions  of  which  were  as 
follows:  — 

NECESSARY  TO  NATURALIZATION. 


1.  Six  months' notice  of  intention; 

2.  Two  years'  continued  registration; 

3.  Residence  in  the  Republic  during  that  time; 

4.  No  dishonouring  sentence; 

5.  Proof  of  obedience  to  the  laws; 

6.  Proof  of  full  State  citizenship  and  franchise  or  title  thereto  in 


former  country. 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


«5 


NECESSARY  TO  FULL  FRANCHISE. 


Continuous  registration  5  years  after  naturalization; 
Continuous  residence  during  that  period; 
No  dishonouring  sentence; 
Proof  of  obedience  to  the  laws. 


I. 
2. 

3. 

4- 

Sir  Alfred. — "This  will  be  carefully  looked  at.  Of  course 
"the  plan  which  it  embodies  differs  absolutely  from  my  plan 
"in  that  it  does  not  provide  for  an  immediate  or  even  an 
"early  enfranchisement  of  people  who  may  have  been  in  the 
"Republic  for  many  years,  and  that  it  makes  no  provision 
"for  an  increase  in  the  number  of  seats  in  the  Volksraad. 
«•  *  *  *  I  should  like  to  take  the  proposal  with  me  in  order 
"to  look  it  over  at  leisure,  but  I  do  not  foresee  any  likeli- 
"hood  of  its  providing  that  settlement  which  I  hope  for,  and 
"I  should  therefore  invite  the  President  when  we  meet 
"again,  if  I  find  that  on  looking  at  it  carefully  my  first  im- 
"pression  is  realized,  to  consider  whether  there  is  any  other 
"way,  apart  from  the  franchise,  of  giving  the  districts  in 
"which  the  foreign  population  principally  reside  some 
"power  of  managing  their  own  affairs;  because  I  foresee 
"that  in  the  period  which  will  elapse  before  this  franchise 
"proposal  produces  any  appreciable  effect  upon  the  tone  of  the 
"legislation  and  administration  the  conflict  between  the  old 
'  'and  the  new  population  is  likely  to  become  more  severe, 
"and  I  cannot  hold  myself  responsible  for  recommending  a 
"solution  of  this  kind."     *    *    * 

President. — "/  zvoidd  regard  the  last  point  to  which  His 
"Excellency  refers— that  they  should  have  the  ruling  of 
"themselves — as  virtually  giving  up  my  land  to  them." 

Sir  Alfred. — "Not  in  any  form?" 

President. — "Of  course  it  would  depend,  but  it  may  mean 
"that  they  have  to  get  full  authority,  because  I  am  already 
"here  giving  them  so  very  much." 

Sir  Alfred. — "I  meant  rather  powers  of  government  such 
'  "as  were  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  State  in  his  despatch 
"of  February,  1896,  when  he  suggested  an  extended munici- 
"pality  for  the  u'hole  district,  control  of  sanitation  and  public 
"order,  and  poxver  of  raising  rates  for  local  purposes,  but  not 
"to  make  taxes  or  to  impose  general  taxation.'^ 

President. — "I  must  look  to  that  because  of  the  first  inrush 
"of  a  greater  number  who  are  not  burghers;  if  I  gave 
"itazuay  in  the  zvay  suggested  I  zvotdd  be  giving  azaay  my 
"land.  You  must  admit  that  it  would  be  as  unfair  as  if  I 
"had  a  rich  farm  and  lots  of  water,  and  I  said  to  others, 
' '  'Come  and  help  work  my  farm  for  me,  and  you  must  give 


l6 


THK  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


"me  a  little  of  what  you  win  on  this  farm,'  and  when  they 
"have  got  rich  on  my  farm  they  said,  'Give  me  the  title 
"deeds  of  that  farm.'  They  actually  have  more  riRhts  than 
"I  have  myself,  because  the  (iold  Fields  form  the  richest 
"part  of  my  land.  Instead  of  being  thankful  for  what  they 
"get  there  they  now  begin  to  want  the  title  deeds,  and 
'  because  they  are  more  numerous  they  would  like  to  have 
"my  farm." 

At  the  next  meeting  the  President  introduced  an  additional  pro- 
posal, the  character  of  which  is  best  shown  by  the  dialogue. 

PkE.sidknT. — "It  escaped  my  mem  ry  yesterday  to  say  that 
"I  will  put  the  proposal  for  the  creation  of  new  electoral 
"divisions  before  the  Volksraad  when  I  get  back." 

Sir  Alfred. — '  'The  proposal  which  the  President  put  in  yester- 
"day  I  naturally  regarded  as  his  complete  proposal,  and  I 
"have  written  a  memorandum  in  answer  thereto  on  that 
"ba.sis,  but  perhaps  the  best  thing  would  be  for  the  President 
"to  tell  me  now,  if  he  is  prepared  to  tell  me,  what  kind  of 
"proposal  he  has  in  his  mind." 

Prksident. — "To  make  more  electoral  divisions,  that  is  my 
"intention."       *        *        # 

Sir  Alfred. — "From  my  point  of  view  this  que.stion  of  the 
"number  of  electoral  divisions  is  one  of  the  vital  points.  I 
"had  before  me  yesterday  a  proposal  which  was  very  care- 
"fully  framed  in  full  detail,  and  I  think  if  this  suggestion 
"which  the  President  throws  out  now  is  to  be  regarded  as 
"part  of  that  proposal  it  should  be  laid  before  me  in  the  same 
"manner  as  that  proposal." 

Pre.sidENT. — "It  was  only  when  thinking  over  these  matters 
"afterwards  that  this  point  occurred  to  me;  it  had  remained 
"in  abeyance. " 

Sir  Alfred. — "I  feel  that  this  matter  is  one  of  such  great  im- 
"portance  that  I  do  not  want  to  forego  the  discussion  // 
'Hhere  is  the  least  hope  of  coming  to  an  agreement.  I  have 
'  'very  great  objections  to  the  proposal  such  as  was  put  before 
"me  yesterday,  which  I  have  put  into  formal  shape.  I  thiuk 
"it  would  be  better  for  me  to  put  in  the  memorandum  I 
"wrote  on  the  proposal  that  was  put  before  me  yesterday.  If, 
"after  considering  that  memorandum,  the  President  is  pre- 
'  'pared  to  make  another  proposal  including  the  things  which 
"he  omitted  yesterday,  or  otherwise  altering  his  original 
"scheme,  I  should  be  prepared    -.    onsider  it." 

President. — "I  cannot  make  o  L .;  oronosals.    I  might  modify 
"some  points  and  fill  in  this  point  which  has  been  omitted." 
Sir  Alfred  Milner's  paper  read. 


THIv  TRANSVAAL   WAR. 


17 


I'KKsiDUNT.  "I  would  like  His  Ivxcellency  to  know  exactly 
'what  I  thitik.  His  ICxcelloncy  is  really  not  sufficiently  ac- 
"quaiuted  witli  the  facts  of  the  casf,  or  he  would  not  make 
"proposals  like  this.  ♦  ♦  «  //  /,•  ^vholly  di^ainst 
"God's  Word  to  lit  strauirrrs  ojiry  on  tfif  (idiniiiisttation, 
'Kst'eiiijf  that  they  cannot  serve  two  masters  at  t/ie  same  time." 

Sir  Alkrbd. — "My  proposal  absolutely  gets  over  the  diffi- 
"culty  about  their  being  strangers.  The  whole  basis  of 
"negotiation.s  is  that  they  mu.st  be  citizens  of  one  State  or 
"the  other.  The  President  must  recognize  my  difficulty. 
"//  A-  an  extrem<;ly  difficult  thing  for  me  to  propose  that  the 
"peof'^r  uhose  interests  I  am  defending  should  give  up  the 
^'citizenship  ichich  they  at  present  have  and  to  7vhich  they  are 
"sincerely  attached.  They  will  not  do  it  readily,  but  I  am 
"sure  that  this  is  the  only  solution;  and  if  I  am  to  recom- 
"mend  this  great  sacrifice  to  them,  then  I  must  be  able 
"to  point  out  to  them  that  they  are  going  to  obtain 
"something  really  valuable  in  return.  What  I  say  is 
"this,  these  people  are  complaining  about  the  way  in  which 
"the  Government  fails  to  regard  their  interests;  they  are 
"always  complaining,  and  they  very  often  call  on  the  British 
"Government  to  help  their  position  in  one  respect  or  in  an- 
"other.  Well,  my  objection  to  that  state  of  things  is  this 
" — I  sympathize,  and  the  British  Government  sympathizes, 
"with  many  of  the  complaints  they  make;  but  our  difficulty 
"is  this:  We  say,  if  we  have  to  take  up  their  individual 
"grievances,  two  things  will  happen— one  is,  we  should  be 
"perpetually  dealing  with  internal  questions  in  the  South 
"African  Republic,  which  is  most  objectionable,  and  the 
"other  thing  is  that  such  representations  as  we  may  make 
"will  not  really  help  them;  they  will  only  annoy  the  Gov- 
"ernment  of  the  South  African  Republic,  and  they  will  not 
"be  productive  of  really  substantial  results  for  the  benefit  of 
'  'the  people.  Therefore,  with  reluctance,  I  have  come  to  the 
'  'conclusion  that  the  best  way  to  enable  these  people  to  have 
"their  reasonable  desires  attended  to  is  to  urge  upon  them  to 
"take  up  the  citizenship  of  the  State  in  which  they  are 
"living;  that  is  to  say,  those  of  them  who  desire  to  live  there 
"and  to  have  their  families  there,  and  bring  up  their 
"children  there,  and  to  make  it  their  permanent  place  of 
"residence.  Of  course,  there  are  thousands  of  people  who 
"only  want  to  stay  in  the  State  for  a  few  years  and  go  away 
"again;  their  position  is  different.  I  am  thinking  now  only 
"of  people  who  want  to  make  the  country  their  home.  For 
"those  British  subjects  who  want  to  make  that  country  their 
"home,  I  say  it  is  the  best  thing  to  go  in  heartily  as  burghers 


iS 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


"o/(/ie  Republic;  but  then,  if  they  are  to  resign  their  British 
''citizenships  let  them  be  really  equal  citize7is  of  their  new 
''State.  I  could  not  reasonably  urge  them  as  a  body  to  ^/ve 
"up  the  one  thing  -without  getting  the  other,  and  this  is  my 
"objection  to  this  particular  scheme.  It  is  hedged  in 
"with  so  many  difficulties,  and  delays  the  attainment 
"of  any  substantial  reform  or  any  substantial  influence 
"to  the  new  citizens  for  so  long,  that  I  feel  it  will  not  meet 
"the  desires  of  the  people  whom  it  is  my  object  to  benefit, 
'  'and  whose  interests  in  the  State  are  so  large. ' ' 
President.— "Tell  His  Excellency  I  say  he  misunderstands 
"the  case,  and  from  a  very  trifling  thing  he  makes  a  very 
"big  thing,  owing  to  the  people's  talk.  *  *  *  * 
"You  must  remember  that  in  England  there  are  milUons  of 
"burghers,  and  the  number  of  burghers  in  the  South 
"African  Republic  is  very  small  in  comparison;  that  makes 
"the  difference.  *         *         *  *  *         *" 

Sir  Alfred. — "They  would  not  be  out- voted  by  my  plan." 
President. — "I   know  they  will  be  out-voted;    they  work 
•'with  money,  which  they  use  freely,  and  we  would  be  out- 
"voted.      But    I    do    not  want  to  go  further    into    that 
"matter."      #****♦** 
Sir  Alfred.— "I  understand  the  President's  difficulties,  but 
"I  cannot  get  him  to  understand  the  feelings  of  the  people 
"on  the  other  side." 
President.— "Of  course,  they  are  always  pursuing  something; 
"they  are  like  naughty  children,  if  you  give  them  a  finger  they 
"will  want  the  ivhole  hand,  then  an  arm,  then  a  head,  and  then 
"thcytcant  the  whole  body  bit  by  bit.     After  I  have  given 
"them  the   arm.  they  still  go  and  try  to  get  the  same  rights 
"asmy  burghers  in  a  short  time.'''    ***** 
At  the  next  meeting,  (morning  of  the  fifth  day),  Sir  Alfred  Milner 
put  in  written  objections  to  the  President's  franchise  proposals,    giving 
the  reasons  why  he  could  not  consider  them  at  all  likely  to  satisfy  the 
minimum  legitimate  demands  of  the  Uitlanders. 

President.— "His  Excellency  must  understand  in  connection 
"with  all  I  have  proposed  that  I  am  not  ready  to  hand  over 
"my  country  to  strangers  *  *  *  * 

"I  regret  that  our  friendly  conference  here  together 
"should  result  in  nothing.  I  understand  from  His  Excel- 
"Icncfs  arguments  that  if  I  do  not  really  give  the  whole 
"management  of  my  land  and  government  to  the  strangers 
"there  is  nothing  to  be  done:'  ***** 
Sir  Alfred. — "I  also  regret  that  our  discussion  should  result 
"in  no  agreement  on  the  subject,  but  I  must  protest 
"against  His  Honor's  repeated  assertion  that  my  proposals 


THE  TRANSVAAI.  WAR. 


19 


"amount  to  his  giving  over  his  land  to  strangers.  It  is  not 
"my  intention,  nor  is  such  a  result  likely  to  be  produced 
"by  anything  I  have  suggested.  I  suppose  the  time  will 
"come  when  the  various  proposals  made  at  this  Conference 
"will  be  before  the  world,  and  then  I  leave  to  impartial 
"judges  to  say  whether  it  can  be  truly  said  that  I  proposed 
"anything  of  the  kind." 
And  thus,  although  there  was  another  short  sitting,  the  Conference 

broke  up  without  even  an  approximate  agreement  upon  the  fundamental 

question  which  brought  it  about. 

Before  going  further  it  will  be  well  to  compare  the  two  schemes. 


THAT  OF  SIR  AlyFRED  MILNER  WAS  : 

1.  Five  years'  residence  ; 

2.  Good  character  and  reasonable  property  or  income  qualifi- 
cation ; 

3.  Oath  of  allegiance,  including  the  defence  of  the  country's 
independence ; 

4.  A  small  number  of  seats  in  the  Volksraad  for  the  Johannesburg 
district,  wh?re  most  of  the  Uitlauder  population  is  centered.  Sir  Alfred's 
contention  was  that  this  population  which,  by  President  Kruger's  own 
admission,  was  greater  than  all  the  burghers  combined,  and  who  paid 
nine- tenths  of  the  taxes,  should  not  be  "in  a  contemptible  minority." 


THAT  OF  PRESIDENT  KRUGER  WAS : 

Naturalization,  with  only  the  most  insignificant  privileges,  after 

1 .  Two  years  and  a  half  residence ; 

2.  Proof  of  obedience  to  the  laws ; 

3.  Proof  of  full  State  citizenship  and  franchise  or  title  thereto  in 
former  country. 

The  full  franchise  after 

1.  A  further  5  years'  residence,  with  continuous  registration  ; 

2.  Proof  of  obedience  to  the  laws. 

There  v/ere  numerous  other  conditions  in  the  President's  scheme, 
but  I  mention  only  the  above  in  order  to  show  their  objectionable  features 
and  impracticability.  In  the  first  place  there  are  five  years  during  which  it 
can  be  fairly  said  that  the  Uitlanders  naturalizing  would  be  under  the  full 
obligations  of  citizenship  with  none  of  its  material  rights.  Secondly, 
conditions  2  and  3  for  naturalization  and  condition  2  for  the  full 
franchise  it  would  be  almost  impossible  to  comply  with.  Suppose  one  of 
ourselves  was  called  upon  to  produce  proof  of  obedience  to  the  laws  of 


20 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


our  own  country,  how  would  he  go  about  it?  Take  my  own  case.  I 
have  been  absent  from  Walkerville  less  than  one  month  ni  the 
past  five  years.  If  I  should  go  to  our  Police  Magistrate  and  ask 
for  a  certificate  that  during  that  time,  or  the  past  two  years,  I 
had  not  broken  any  law,  would  he  give  it?  Certainly  not.  He 
would  say  to  me,  "My  dear  Sir,  all  that  I  can  .state  is  that  you  have  not 
"been  charged  with  any  offence  before  me.  What  you  may  have  done  m 
"other  parts  of  the  country  I  know  nothing  whatever  about. "  How 
much  more  difficult  would  it  be  to  produce  such  proof  in  a  country  like 
the  Transvaal,  with  little  of  our  complete  legal  machinery  ;  \yith  all  the 
officials  of  a  different  race,  speaking  a  different  language  and  hostile  to 
the  new  population  ? 

Suppose  again,  that  having  emigrated  to  the  Transvaal  I  require 
proof  that  I  enjoyed  full  citizenship  and  franchise,  or  was  entitled  thereto, 
in  Canada.  To  whom  would  I  write  for  it  ?  What  officials  have  we  who 
are  authorized  to  issue  such  proof?  If  we  had  them  what  certainty 
would  there  of  necessity  be,  unless  they  were  familiar  with  my  hand- 
writing, that  I  was  the  person  who  formerly  Uved  here?  Having  got 
my  certificate  how  would  I  identify  myself  in  the  Transvaal  as  the  party 
named  in  the  document  ?  How  would  I  prove  to  the  Transvaal  that  the 
Canadian  Official  was  the  proper  person  to  issue  it?  And  then  consider 
further  that  the  vast  majority  of  the  Uitlanders  are  working  men, 
with  little  experience  of  business  and  affairs.  Still  further  con- 
sider the  case  of  men  who  when  they  left  their  native  country 
had  not  reached  the  voting  age,  or  were  not  possessed  of  the  voting  qual- 
ifications, or  if  entitled  thereto  had  failed  to  get  their  names  upon  the 

voters'  list. 

Looking  at  these  unusual,  (it  is  not  too  much  to  say  impossible), 
conditions,  what  conclusion  can  we  come  to  than  that  President  Kruger 
had  no  intention  whatever  of  proposing  a  franchise  which  was  practicable; 
that  he  merely  offered  the  .shadow  without  the  substance,  thinking 
thereby  to  give  the  complexion  of  bona  fides  to  his  repeated  professions  of 
a  desire  to  meet  the  rea.sonable  demands  of  the  Uitlanders,  as  represented 
by  the  British  Commissioner.  _        **_ 

The  Bloemfontein  Conference  having  thus  proved  abortive,  Sir 
Alfred  Milner  was  instructed,  June  6th,  1899,  to  forward  to  Mr.  Kruger 
Mr.  Chamberlain's  note  of  May  loth,  which  had  been  held  back  in  the 
hope  that  the  Conference  might  render  its  presentation  unnecessary. 

That  note,  after  referring  to  the  petition  from  21,684  British 
subjects  before  mentioned,  and  .setting  forth  the  right  of  every  Govern- 
ment to  interpose  under  such  circumstances  if  convinced  that  the  com- 
plaints are  justified,  proceeded  in  calm  and  friendly  language  to  state 
the  wrongs  of  the  Outlanders  generally  ;  that  British  subjects  had  been 
arbitrarily  arrested  in  the  dead  of  night,  dragged  from  their  beds  and 
cruelly  beaten  and  kicked  by  ruffianly  field  cornets  whom  the  Govern- 
ment "refused  to  punish  ;  that  a  British  subject,  named  Edgar,  had  his 


Jl 


THE  TRANvSVAAL   WAR. 


21 


K 


house  broken  into,  and  was  himself  shot  dead  by  one  of  four  policemen, 
who  had  no  warrant,  and  not  one  of  whom  saw  him  commit  any  offence; 
or  indeed  knew  that  he  had  connnitted  any.  The  charge  was  that  Edgar 
struck  one  of  the  invaders  with  a  stick,  but  that  was  denied  by  his  wife 
and  others.  The  policeman  was  tried  and  acquitted,  the  Judge  warmly 
approving  the  verdict. 

In  conclusion  Mr.  Chamberlain  said: 

"These  complaints  may  be  summarised  in  the 
"statement  that  under  present  conditions,  all  of  which  have 
"arisen  since  the  Convention  of  1884  was  .signed,  the 
"Uitlanders  are  now  denied  that  equality  of  treatment 
"which  that  instrument  was  designed  to  .secure  for  them. 

"The  conditions  subsisting  in  the  South  African  Re- 
"public  are  altogether  inconsistent  with  such  equality,  and 
"are  in  striking  contrast  to  those  subsisting  in  all  Briti.sh 
"Colonies  posses.sing  representotive  institutions,  where 
"white  men  of  every  race  enjoy  equal  freedom  and  equal 
"justice,  and  new-comers  are,  after  a  reasonable  period  of 
"residence,  admitted  to  full  political  rights.  In  the  Orange 
"Free  State,  where  .similar  privileges  are  conceded  to  all 
"aliens  resident  in  the  Republic,  the  Dutch  burgher  and  the 
"foreign  immigrant  who  enjoys  the  hospitality  of  the  State 
"live  in  harmony  and  mutual  confidence;  and  theindepend- 
"ence  of  the  Republic  is  .secured  as  well  by  the  contentment 
'  'and  loyalty  of  all  its  citizens  as  by  the  good  relations  which 
"prevail  between  its  Government  and  those  of  other  parts 
"of  South  Africa. 

'  'Unfortunately  the  policy  of  the  South  African  Re- 
"pubUc  has  been  conducted  on  very  different  lines,  and  but 
"for  the  anxiety  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  extend 
"every  consideration  to  a  weaker  State  which  in  recent 
"years  has  had  just  reason  to  complain  of  the  action  of  British 
"subjects,  and  may  therefore  be  naturally  prone  to  suspicion 
"and  indisposed  to  take  an  impartial  view  of  the  situation, 
"the  state  of  affairs  must  have  led  to  the  most  .serious  pro- 
"test  and  remonstrance.  Recognizing,  however,  the  ex- 
"ceptional  circumstances  of  the  case,  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 
"ernment  have  refrained  since  their  despatch  of  the  4th  of 
"February,  1896,  from  any  pressure  on  the  Government  of  the 
"South  African  RepubUc  except  in  cases  in  which  there  has 
"been  a  distinct  breach  of  the  provisions  of  the  Convention 
"of  1884;  and  they  have  sincerely  hoped  that  the  Govern- 
"ment  of  the  Republic  would  voluntarily  meet  the  expecta- 
"tions  raised  by  the  President,  and  would  take  the  necessary 
"steps  to  secure  that  willing  loyalty  of  all  the  inhabitants  of 
"the  State  which  would  be  the  best  guarantee  for  its  secur- 


22 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


"ity  and  independence.  They  are  most  unwilling  to  depart 
"from  their  attitude  of  reserve  and  expectancy,  but  having 
"regard  to  the  position  of  Great  Britain  as  the  Paramount 
"Power  in  South  Africa,  and  the  duty  incumbent  upon  them 
"to  protect  all  British  subjects  residing  in  a  foreign  country, 
"they  cannot  permanently  ignore  the  exceptional  and  arbi- 
"trary  treatment  to  which  their  fellow-countrymen  and 
"others  are  exposed,  and  the  absolute  indifference  of  the 
'.'Government  of  the  Republic  to  the  friendly  representations 
"which  have  been  made  to  them  on  the  subject.  They  still 
"cheri.sh  the  hope  that  the  publicity  given  to  the  pre.sent 
"representations  of  the  Uitlander  population,  and  the  fact, 
'  'of  which  the  Government  of  the  South  African  Republic 
"must  be  aware,  that  they  are  losing  the  sympathy  of  those 
"other  States  which,  like  Great  Britain,  are  deeply  inter- 
"ested  in  the  prosperity  of  the  Transvaal,  may  induce  them  to 
"reconsider  their  policy,  and,  by  redressing  the  most  seri- 
'  'ous  of  the  grievances  now  complained  of,  to  remove  a  stand- 
"ing  danger  to  the  peace  and  prosperity  not  only  of  the 
"Republic  itself  but  also  of  South  Africa  generally. 
'^Her  Majesty s  Government  earnestly  desire  the  prosperity  of 
"the  South  African  Republic.  They  have  been  anxious  to 
"avoid  any  interventio7i  in  its  internal  concerns,  and  they  may 
"point  out  in  this  connection  that  if  they  really  entertained  the 
'  'design  of  destroying  its  indepc7idence ,  ivhich  has  been  attri- 
"buted  to  them,  no  policy  could  be  better  calculated  to  defeat 
"their  object  than  that  which,  in  all  friendship  and  sincerity^ 
"they  now  tirge  upott  the  Government  of  the  South  African 
'  'Republic,  and  which  would  remove  any  pretext  for  interfer- 
"ence  by  relieving  British  subjects  of  all  just  cause  of 
"complaint.'^ 

Following  the  failure  of  the  Conference  a  large  meeting  of  Johan- 
nesburg Uitlanders,  estimated  at  5,000,  was  held,  at  which  a  resolution 
was  passed  that  the  President's  proposals  were  utterly  inadequate  to  pro- 
duce satisfaction.  The  seconder  of  the  resolution  was  an  American 
citizen,  Mr.  Seymour,  a  distinguished  engineer. 

Returning  to  Pretoria  on  June  6th,  the  President,  three  days  later, 
caused  his  report  of  the  Conference  to  be  laid  before  the  Volksraad, 
which  by  acclamation  approved  his  course. 

On  June  12th,  the  President  introduced  in  the  Volksraad  r  draft 
franchise  law  which,  while  slightly  changed,  was  in  effect  what  he  had 
proposed  at  Bloemfontein.  At  short  intervals  other  changes  were  intro- 
duced, and  these  were  so  frequent  that  it  was  quite  impossible  for  Sir 
Alfred  Milner  to  keep  Mr.  Chamberlain  informed  up  to  date  what  effect 
they  were  likely  to  have. 


THE  TRANSVAAIv  WAR. 


93 


On  July  nth,  Mr.  Chamberlain  telegraphed  requesting  that  if 
the  Transvaal  Government  desired  that  their  franchise  proposals  should 
be  an  element  in  the  settlement  between  the  two  countries  the  British 
Government  should  have  an  opportunity  of  considering  the  scheme  before 
it  became  law.  The  Transvaal's  reply  was  that  as  the  measure  was 
already  before  the  Volksraad  that  was  not  practicable  ;  an  excuse  of  the 
most  transparent  kind. 

On  July  13th  the  Volksraad  took  up  a  draft  franchise  law  in  which 
still  further  changes  had  been  made.  It  improved  upon  the  former  pro- 
posal in  some  respects,  but  there  were  still  many  grave  objections,  among 
others  that  people  who  came  into  the  country  as  far  back  as  1 89 1 ,  1892  and 
1893  would  have  to  wait  from  one  to  four  years,  and  that  the  formalities 
were  cumbersome  and  calculated  to  cause  difficulty   and  delay. 

Within  a  week  this  law  was  passed  by  the  Volksraad  with  only  one 
trifling  amendment.  The  President  and  his  advisers  had  been  distinctly 
informed  that  the  British  Government  could  not  regard  the  law  as  a  satis- 
factory solution  of  the  difficulty,  but  nevertheless,  (in  spite  of  all  the 
President  had  said  at  Bloemfontein  a  few  weeks  before  as  to  the  impos- 
sibility of  inducing  his  burghers  to  consent  to  a  less  liberal  measure 
except  in  exchange  for  certain  concessions  by  England  in  other  directions), 
this  law  was  rushed  through  the  Volksraad  ;  why,  it  is  difficult  to  under- 
stand, unless  the  object  was  to  keep  up  the  pretence  of  anxiety  to  satisfy 
the  Uitlanders  and  the  British  Government. 

A  public  meeting  of  the  unenfranchised  at  Johannesburg  declared 
this  law  wholly  unacceptable. 

On  July  31st,  Mr.  Chamberlain  telegraphed  to  Sir  Alfred  Milner  : 

"I  now  authorize  you  to  invite  President  Kruger  to 
"appoint  delegates  to  discuss  with  ours  question  whether 
"reforms  which  Volksraad  has  passed  will  give  immediate 
"and  substantial  representation  of  Uitlanders,  and  if  not, 
"what  additions  and  alterations  will  be  necessary  in  order 
"to  secure  this  result." 

On  August  15th,  the  British  Agent  at  Pretoria,  Mr.  Greene,  tele- 
graphed to  Sir  Alfred  Milner  that  the  Transvaal  Government  had  indi- 
cated their  willingness  to  make  certain  proposals  to  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 
ermnent  provided  the  latter  would  not  press  their  request  for  the  pro. 
posed  joint  enquiry  into  the  political  representation  of  the  Uitlanders. 
What  the  British  Agent  understood  those  proposals  to  be  was  set  out  in 
detail  in  his  telegram.     Thev  were  concessions  of  the  most  radical  kind, 
closely  approximating  the  suggestions  made  by  Sir  Alfred  Milner  at  the 
Conference.     One  proposal  was  thus  expressed  by  the  British  Agent: 
"The  simple  details  of  the  franchise  law  to  be  dis- 
'  'cussed  with  the  British  Agent.    He  may  have  his  own  legal 
' 'adviser.     Any  other  points  which  may  arise  to  be  discussed 
"in  the  .same  way." 


24 


THE   TRANSVAAL   WAR. 


The  British  Government  rephecl  that  it  was  prepared  to  consider 
the  proposals  indicated  on  their  merits. 

On  August  19th,  the  Transvaal  State  Secretary  presented  a  note 
of  what  his  Government  was  prepared  to  reconnuend  to  the  Volksraad  ; 
but  it  did  not  contain  tlic  proposal  above  quoted. 

This  itnix)rtant  omission  having  been  brought  to  the  attention 
of  the  State  Secretary  he  repudiated  the  British  A^i^ent's  version  of  the 
matter,  a/thoui^h  the  British  Agent's  telegram  containing  that  identical 
proposition  -was  initialled  by  the  Transvaal  State  Attorney,  who  had  repre- 
sented his  Government  in  the  discussion  of  which  the  said  telegram  was 

the  result. 

And  further  to  show  the  shifting  and  unscrupulous  methods  of  the 
Transvaal  in  these  negotiations  :  when  now,  for  the  first  time,  proposing 
a  franchise  likely  to  prove  acceptable  to  the  Uitlanders,  and  consequently 
also  to  the  British  Government,  they  made  it  an  express  condition  thereof 
that  the  claim  of  suzerainty  should  be  abandoned,  a  condition  which  Sir 
Alfred  Milner  had  declared  at  Bloemfontein  could  under  no  circumstances 
be  entertained. 

The  British  Government,  while  admitting  that  this  franchi!>2 
scheme  was  an  enormous  improvement  on  the  previous  ones,  and  express- 
ing the  opinion  that  it  could  easily  be  made  the  basis  of  a  satisfactory 
settlement  of  the  Uitlanders'  grievances,  firmly  dechned  to  accept  the 
conditions  attached  thereto,  and  the  Transvaal  refused  to  withdraw  them. 
There  these  negotiarions  really  ended,  although  the  Transvaal,  until  the 
last,  kept  up  the  pretence  of  wishing  to  come  to  an  understanding,  but  with 
a  lack  of  good  faith  which  the  despatches  only  too  plainly  show. 


THE  BRITISH  CLAIM  OF  SUZERAINTY. 

The  term  "  suzerainty"  is  admittedly  somewhat  difficult  of  precise 
definition;  but  it  has  been  stated  time  and  again  on  the  English  side  to 
mean  that  she,  as  the  power  having  the  vastly  preponderating  possessions 
and  interests  in  South  Africa,  cannot  permit  anything  dangerous  to  those 
possessions  or  interests  to  be  done  by  the  Transvaal,  whether  within  its 
own  borders  or  not. 

The  British  Government  maintain  that  the  right  of  England  to  take 
that  position  is  recognized  by  the  Conventions  of  1881  and  1884.  They 
hold  that  although  the  articles  of  the  former  were  replaced  by  those  of 
the  latter,  the  preamble  of  the  first  Convention  was  preserved.  The  Trans- 
vaal Government  assert  that  the  Convention  of  188 1  was  entirely  an- 
nulled by  the  later  agreement ;  and  to  support  their  contention  they  have 
not  hesitated  to  disregard  certain  evident  facts,  nor  even  to  make  state- 
ments which  are  positively  without  foundation. 

We  must  leave  it  to  lawyers  to  decide  what  the  true  interpretation 
of  the  document  is;  bin  we  may  at  least  look  at  the  ground  taken  by 
the  parties  in  their  discussion  thereof. 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


as 


The  Convention  of  1881  reserved  suzerainty  to  the  Queen  in  broad, 
general  terms  by  its  preamble,  as  follows  : 

"Her  Majesty's  Commissioners  *  *  *  hereby 
"undertake  and  guarantee  on  behalf  of  Her  Majesty  that 
«.♦  *  #  complete  self-government,  subject  to  the  Suzer- 
"ainty  of  Her  Majesty,  *  *  *  will  be  accorded  to  the 
"inhabitants  of  the  Transvaal  territory.  *  *  *" 
There  were  also  Articles  of  the  Convention  which  specifically 
defined  certain  suzerain  rights. 

Before  long  the  Boers  began  to  complain  of  this  Convention,  and 
finally  Mr.  Kruger  and  two  companions  were  sent  to  London  by  the 
Volksraad  to  negotiate  for  a  fresh  understanding.  They  at  first  asked  to 
be  treated  as  an  independent  power,  which  request  was  promptly  and 
positively  declined.  They  then,  at  Lord  Derby's  suggestion,  formulated 
their  views  in  writing  under  date  of  November  14th,  1883,  from  which  I 

quote : 

"The  impracticability  of  the  Convention  has  appeared 

"chiefly  in  the  following  points  : 

The  Western  boundary  as  defined  in  Article  i. 

The  EXTENT  of  the  suzerain  rights  reserved  to  Her 

"Majesty  by  Articles  2  and  18. 
The  obligation  contained  in   Article  3   to  previously 
"submit  for  the  approval  of  Her  Majesty  all  new 
"regulations  concerning  the  interests  of  the   natives 
"within    the    Republic  before  they  can  come  into 
"force  ;  and 
The    financial    settlement    contained   in    Articles    10 
and  II." 
It  should  be  particularly  noted  that  the  objection  was  to  "the  exteni 
"of  the  suzerainty,"  and  that  while  the  articles  which  the  Boers  desired  to 
modify  were  specified  there  was  no  mention  of  the  preamble. 

Twelve  days  later  they  submitted  to  Lord  Derby  a  draft  Treaty  or 
Convention,  which  was  rejected  by  him  on  the  ground  that  it  was  "neither 
"in  form  nor  in  substance  such  as  Her  Majesty's  Government  could 
"adopt." 

It  is  a  very  common  thing  for  people  to  ask  more  than  they  expect 
to  get  and  to  get  less  than  they  ask.  There  is  the  Convention  itself  to 
show  what  the  agreement  was,  and  I  would  not  go  into  these  preliminaries 
but  for  the  fact  that  the  Boers  have  since  dragged  in  all  kinds  of  state- 
ments as  to  what  they  wanted,  what  transpired  verbally,  and  what 
correspondence,  &c.,  passed  between  them  and  Lord  Derby  previous  to 
the  signing  of  the  Convention.  My  object  is  to  show  their  shallow 
arguments  and  positive  untruthfulness. 


"a. 
"b. 


"c. 


"d. 


86 


THE   TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


In  April,  1898,  Dr.  Leyds,  then  Secretary  of  State,  set  up  the  follow- 
ing contentious  among  numerous  others  : 


FROM  TRANSVAAIy 
DKSPATCHES. 

"In  the  year  1883  a  deputation  was 
"sent  to  London  with  a  view  to 
^''obtain  the  abolition  of  the  suzer- 
"ainty." 


COMMENTS  THEREON. 

It  seems   an  odd  contention  that 

what  the  deputation  was  sent  with 

a  vieiv  to  obtain  they   of  necessity 

did  obtain. 

m  *  * 


"In  their  report  published  in  1884, 

"/A^  deputation  stated  that  the   new 

"Convention    put    an    end   to   the 

"British  suzerainty. 

"Acting-  on   that  report  the  Volks- 

"raad    *     *     *    ratified    the  Con- 

"vention." 

*         *         * 


What  the  deputation  may  have 
stated  about  the  Convention  proves 
nothing.  Moreover,  the  resolution 
of  the  Volksraad  ratifying  the  Con- 
vention bears  no  evidence  whatever 
that  it  was  influenced  by  the  report 
of  the  deputation. 


"That  it  was  the  intention  to  have 

"the  whole  of  the  old   Convention 

"superseded  by  the  new  one  appears 

"moreover  from  the  declarations  of 

"the  contracting  parties,  which  can 

"be  personally   confirmed   by   His 

"Honor  the  State  President." 
*         *         * 


The  intentions  of  parties  to  a  written 
agreement  are  assumed  to  be  shown 
by  the  agreement,  not  by  what  any 
of  them  may  subsequently  .say. 
Of  England's  representatives  in  the 
negotiations  only  one  now  survived, 
and  he  denied  this  claim. 


"If  the  British  Government  had 
"wished  to  retain  the  suzerainty  in 
"the  Convention  of  1884,  as  well  as 
"in  that  of  1881,  it  -coould  have  been 
^'necessary  for  the  British  Govern- 
^'mcnt  to  have  come  to  a  clear  and 
'■'■disti)ict  understanding  on  the  sub- 
"ject." 


The  Transvaal  being  the  complain- 
ing party  it  would  be  much  fairer 
to  say,  "If  the  Transvaal  Delegates 
"believed  that  the  suzeranity  was 
"abandoned  they  should  have  seen 
"that  it  was  clearly  and  distinctly 
"expressed."  There  is  nothing  to 
indicate  that  they  were  not  fully 
able  to  look  after  themselves. 


"Whenever  it  was  the  intention  to 
"preserve  any  stipulation  of  the  old 
"Convention  of  1881,  it  was  re- 
"inserted  in  the  Convention  of 
"1884." 


Here  again  it  is  proper  to  remark 
that  the  Convention  is  supposed  to 
show  what  was  intended,  and  it 
certainly  does  not  say  that  it  con- 
tains whatever  it    was    desired  to 

retain  of  the  former  Convention. 

«        *        « 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


aj 


*'This  Government  is  in  the  posses- 
"siou  of  a  declaration,  made  by 
"Messrs.  Kruger  and  Ksselen, 
"respectively  member  of  and  Secre- 
♦'tary  to  the  deputation  of  1884, 
"stating  that  it  was  expressly  agreed 
"upon  verbally  with  Lord  Derby 
"that    the    suzerainty  was    to   be 

"abolished." 

♦        *        * 

"The  text  of  the  preamble  of  the 
"Convention  of  London  clearly 
"shows  that  it  was  not  the  inten- 
"tion  merely  to  alter  the  Arti- 
"cles  of  the  Convention  of  1881, 
"(and  to  allow  the  preamble  of  1 88 1 
"to  remain  in  force),  but  to  have  the 
"Convention  altered  in  its  entirety y 


"The  Preamble  of  1884  makes  no 
"mention  of  'new  articles,'  but  of 
"'the  following  articles  of  a  new 
"♦Convention."' 


"The  provision  made  in  the  lant 
"part  of  the  Preamble  of  1884,  that 
"as  long  as  the  new  Convention 
"shall  not  be  ratified  Hhc  old  Con- 
^'■'■vcntion  shall  continue  in  full  force 
"  'and  effect,'  can  have  no  other 
"meaning  than  that  after  the  ratifi- 
"cation  of  the  new  one  the  old  one 
"ceases  to  have  effect." 


Lord  Derby  said  in  the  House  of 
Lords  only  a  few  weeks  after  the 
Convention  was  signed,  and  months 
before  it  was  ratified  by  the  Volks- 
raad,  "Whatever  suzerainty  meant 
"in  the  Convention  of  Pretoria, 
''(1881),  the  condition  of  things 
"which  it  implied  still  remains." 


A  good  many  things  are  taken  for 
granted  by  Dr.  Leyds.  Common 
sense,  however,  would  suggest  that 
if  it  had  been  the  intention  to  do 
away  with  the  former  Convention 
entirely  it  would  have  been  so 
stated.  What  the  new  Convention 
says  is  that  certain  Articles  shall  be 
substituted  for  other  Articles. 

*  *        * 

Articles  which  were  to  be  substi- 
tuted for  others  would  seem  to  be 
"new  articles"  without  being  so 
called.  "■New  articles  of  a  new 
"Convention"  would  hardly  be  good 

English. 

*  *        * 

Here  is  a  falsehood.  The  words 
quoted  as  occurring  in  the  Pre- 
amble of  iSS^  are  not  to  be  found 
therein.  What  we  do  find  is^this  : 
"the  following  articles  of  a  new 
"Convention  *  *  shall  when  rati- 
''fied  *  *  be  substituted  for  the 
''articles  embodied  in  the  Convention 
"of  3rd  August,  1 881;  which  latter, 
"pending  such  ratification,  shall 
"continue  in  full  force  and  effect." 

If  the  word  "latter"  does  not 
refer  to  the  whole  phrase,  "Articles 
"embodied  in  the  Convention  of 
"188 1,"  and  not  to  "Convention" 
simply,  there  is  something  wrong 
with  the  grammar  of  the  British 
and  Transvaal  Governments. 


28 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


It  must  be  a  desperate  case,  indeed,  which  needs  to  be  bolstered  up 
with  such  special  pleading  as  the  above,  and  positive  falsification  of  the 
documents  in  dispute. 

It  is  not  necessary  diat  one  should  be  a  lawyer  to  appreciate  some 
very  obvious  features  of  the  Convention  of  1884. 
The  I'reanil)le  reads  thus  : 

' '  Whereas  the  Government  of  the  Transvaal  State, 
"through  its  delegates      '-^      *     ■<^      have  represented  that 
"the  Convention  signed    at  Pretoria  on  the   3rd  day    of 
"August,  1881     *     *    *    contains  certain  provisions  which 
"are  inconvenient,   and   imposes   burdens   and  ()l)ligations 
"from  which  the  said  State  is  desirous  to  be  relieved     -^     -^ 
"and  whereas   Her   Majesty  the  Queen      *     "''■     /uis  been 
'^ pleased  to  take  the  said  representations  into  consideration  : 
"Now  therefore  Her  Majesty  has  been  pleased  to  direct,"  etc. 
This  certainly  is  not  the  language  which  we  should  look  for  in  an 
agreement  between  two  independent  powers ;    but  it  is  quite  consistent 
with  the  claim  of  superiority  on  the  one  side  and  its  admission  on  the 
other.     And  further,  the  Resolution  of  the  Volksraad  ratifying  the  Con- 
vention concludes  with  tiiese  words  : 

"Resolves,  with  acknowleds^ment  of  the  i>;enerosity  of 
"Her  Britan)iic  Afajesty,  to  ratify,  as  it  hereby  does,  the 
"said  Convention  of  London." 

These  are  hardly  the  terms  in  which  a  treaty  between  equals 
would  be  referred  to;  and  they  cannot  be  explained  by  any  disposition  on 
the  part  of  the  Boers  to  show  unnecessary  civility  toward  Great  Britain. 
The  matters  complained  of  by  British  subjects  in  the  Transvaal  did 
not  stop  with  themselves.  In  another  aspect  these  grievances  were  of 
enormous  importance.  I  refer  to  the  influence  which  Transvaal  affairs 
had  upon  the  safety  and  well-being  of  British  possessions  in  South  Africa 
and  elsewhere. 

It  was  alleged  that  the  constantly  increasing  bitterness  between  the 
British  and  Dutch  races  in  the  Transvaal  was  strongly  reflected  in  the 
adjoining  colonies,  and  had  become  a  very  serious  menace  to  their  future, 
as  well  as  a  great  interference  with  their  present  prosperity.  It  was  fur- 
ther alleged  that  the  ill-treatment  by  the  Boers  of  natives  of  India  tended 
to  undermine  the  respect  of  their  countrymen  for  their  British  rulers.  If 
these  allegations  were  true  England  had  every  right  to  demand  a  remedy. 
The  07ily  question  is  whether  they  were  tt  ue. 

Well,  as  to  that,  the  best  judges  should  be  the  people  on  the  spot, 
and  they  .spoke  with  no  uncertain  voice. 

Petitions  from  38,500  British  subjects  in  Cape  Colony,  about  7,500 
in  Natal,  by  2,000  in  Rhodesia,  affirmed  that  the  treatment  of  the  luiglish 
speaking  population  of  the  Transvaal  caused  an  intense  race  feeling  which 
was  dividing  and  embittering  all  South  Africa,  and  that  only  by  the  re- 
iuu\al  uf  these  gric\uiices  could  peace  be  ])ut  upon  a  firm  foundation. 


THI<:  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


•9 


It  was  unanimously  resolved  that: 

"The  IvCKislative  Assembly  of  Nalal  desires  to  ex- 
"press  its  sympathy  with,  and  approval  of,  the  action  of  the 
"British  Government  in  its  endeavor  to  secure  ecjual  rights 
"and  privileges  for  all  luiropcaiis  in  Sonth  Africa,  jc/ifreby 
*' peace,  prosperity  and  Ihe  termination  of  racial  animosity  in 
*'this  country  can  alone  be  assured." 

Public  meetings  were  held  in  all  parts  of  British  South  Africa,  at 
which  resolutions  were  passed  declaring  in  emphatic  language  tliat  the 
hituation  created  hy  the  Transvaal  conditions  demanded  immediate  relief. 

If  these  representations  by  the  people  concerned  were  true,  the 
Transvaal  was  breeding  political  pestilence  to  the  great  injury  of  Her 
Majesty's  subjects  in  Her  Majesty's  Dominions;  and  any  nation  which 
under  such  circumstances  should  refrain  from  demanding  redress  would 
deservedly  forfeit  sooner  or  later  the  allegiance  of  its  appealing  subjects, 
besides  ceasing  at  once  to  rank  as  a  first-class  power. 

I  submit,  then,  that  no  Convention  is  needed  to  justify  the 
position  taken  l)y  Great  Hritain.  vSelf-preservation  is  the  first  law  of 
nature  for  nations  as  well  as  for  individuals.  The  Boers  cannot  deny  this 
obvious  proposition,  for  they  have  themselves  more  than  once  put  it  for- 
ward in  their  despatches  regarding  the  suzerainty. 

The  United  States  has  declared  that  she  is,  and  intends  to  be,  the 
paramount  ix)wer  in  this  Hemisphere.  The  Monroe  doctrine,  (  whether 
originally  or  not,  certainly  in  its  modern  form),  is  based  upon  that  claim. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  first  demand  of  the  American 
Government  \\\x.m  vS])ain  was  not  that  Cuba  should  be  given  independence, 
but  that  a  speedy  end  should  be  put  to  the  war,  because  it  was  against 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  that  such  a  condition  of  thinji,s  should 
continue  indefinitely. 

When  we  consider  that  in  her  case  the  seat  of  disturbance  was 
far  away — among  a  population  entirely  different  from  her  own — 
with  no  really  great  national  interest  affected,  while  in  our  case  the 
British  possessions  border  upon  the  Transvaal — the  same  race>  inhabit 
l,oth — the  friction  between  them  in  the  Republic  was  most  seriously 
reflected  in  the  Colonies — it  must  be  at  once  conceded  that  the  com- 
parison is  vastly  in  our  favor. 

In  his  message  to  Congress,  April  ii,  1898,  President  McKinley 


said 


"The  only  hope  of  relief  and  repose  from  a  condition 
"which  can  no  longer  beendured  is  the  enforced  pacification 
"of  Cuba.  In  the  name  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of  civili- 
"zation,  in  behalf  of  endangered  American  interests  'aliich 
''give  lis  the  right  and  the  duty  to  speak  and  to  act,  the  war 
"in  Cuba  mu.st  .stop." 


M 


30 


Tine   TRANSVAAL   WAR. 


Here,  it  seems  to  me,  is  dear  rect)>i;uitio"ii  of  the  principle  wiiicli 
aiiiiiiated  KuKlaiiil  in  Sonth  Africa.  W'lietlier  the  state  of  things  affect- 
in,;  hninanity  and  civih/.ation  were  worse  or  better  in  Cuba  than  in  the 
Transvaal,  I  think  there  can  1)e  no  donbt  al)ont  the  cuiiantri'rrd  British 
interests  in  the  British  South  African  iK)ssessions. 


THE  INSINCERITY  OF  THE  HOKR  G0VERNME:NT. 

A  thorough  examination  of  the  negotiations  shows  that  the 
candour  and  patience  displayed  l)y  Mr.  ClKind)erlain  and  Sir  Alfred 
Miliier  from  first  to  la.st  are  as  conspicuous  as  are  evasion,  exasperating 
disregard  for  facts,  and  puerile  argument  on  the  part  of  President  Kruger 
and  those  representing  the  Transvaal. 

We  have  seen  how  the  President  declared  again  antl  again  that  to 
give  to  the  Uitlanders  a  jjronounced  minority  representation  in  t'ht 
\'olksraad  would  swamp  tlie  old  burghers,  although  he  made  no  attemj)! 
to  show  how;  we  have  seen  also  tliat  when  vSir  Alfred  Miliier,  despairing 
of  any  effective  franchise  ccmcession,  expressed  himself  willing  to  be  satis- 
fied if  the  Uitlanders  were  granted  mere  municipal  control  of  their  own  city, 
the  President  insisted  that  this  likewise  wonld  endanger  the  inde]iend- 
ence  of  his  countrv.  His  utterly  inappropriate  references  to  the  vScrip- 
tnres,  and  his  really  silly  parables,  are  perhaps  the  oddest  examples  of 
diplomatic  discussion  to  be  found  in  print. 

I  have  .shown  that  the  Transvaal  State  .Secretary  in  one  of  his 
despatches  jjositively  falsified  the  language  of  the  Preamble  of  the  Con- 
vention of  1 884. 

We  find  that  later  his  successor  repudiated  a  telegram  which  bore 
the  initials  of  his  colleague,  the  State  Attorney,  who  was  acting  on 
behalf  of  his  Ciovernment. 

Mr.  vSnuits,  the  State  Attorney,  writing  on  August  23th  to  the 
British  Agent  at  Pretoria,  with  regard  to  this  same  matter  said: 

"/  never  intended  these  eonversations  tobe  eonveyed  to 

'  'your  Covernnient. ' ' 

The  amazing  character  of  this  statement  will  be  realized  when  it 
it  is  known  that  the  Transvaal  Government's  note  of  August  19th,  was 
sent  in  conseciueiice  of  the  British  Government's  reply  to  wliat  Mr.  Smuts 
did  not  intern/  slioiild  be  eoninninieated  to  tlie  liritisli  (iovernnieiit. 

In  other  words,  the  Tran.svaal  State  Attorney  comes  to  the  British 
Agent  and  says  his  Government  is  prepared  to  make  certain  proposals  if 
they  would  be  favorably  received;  thereupon  the  British  Agent  drafts  a 
telegram  to  his  Superior,  which  the  State  Attorney  approves  by  his  ini- 
tials; in  due  course  the  Transvaal  State  Secretary  (the  Superior  of  the 
State  Attorney)  is  advised  that  the  British  Government  invites  the  .said 
proposals:  next,  the  State  Secretary  presents  in  writino^  several  proposals 


THK   TRANSVAAL   WAR. 


3< 


identical  with  tliose  telegraphed  and  one  materially  differing  therefrom; 
following  this  he  denies  the  accuracy  of  th»-  telegram  which  his  snhordi 
nate  approved;    and,  finally,  the  subordinate  blandly  declares  that  the 
telegram  was  not  intended  to  be  sent. 

If  this  story  were  not  absolutely  authenticated  by  the  ofTicial  docu- 
ments it  would  l)e  impossible  to  believe  it. 

Aniiiii,  lifter  the  Stale  Attonicy  had  thus  declared  that  his  rouversa- 
tioii  7i'ith  Mr.  (ireeue  r.v/.v  not  intruded  to  be  eommuuieated  to  the  liritish 
Goveriiinent,  the  Stite  Secretary  wrote  this: 

"This  Ciovernment  has  observed  with  the  deepest  re- 
"gret  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  have  not  l)een  al)le  to 
"decide  on  acceptinjj;  the  pn)]M)sals  set  forth  in  its  notes  njth 
"August  and  21st  August,  the  more  so  th'.it from  seiiii-o/Jieiol 
" discussions  they  had  thoii}>ht  that  they  iiiiaht  infer  that  their 
'' proposals  ivoitld  have  been  acceptable  to  Her  Majesty" s  Cov- 
"ernnient.'" 

And,  yet,  according  to  Mr.  Smuts,  these  "semi-official  discussions" 
were  supposed  to  be  unknown  to  the  British  Govenunent. 

The  reply  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  ro  the  Transvaal  notes  of  August 
lytli  and  2 1  St,  was  that  he  could  not  accept  the  conditions  as  to  suzer- 
ainty,  etc.,  but  he  nuule  counter-proposal^,  and  suggested  a  further  con- 
ference between  the  President  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner. 

The  answer  of  the  Transvaal  to  this  was  a  withdrawal  of  the  whole 
proposition,  and  no  otiier  was  substituted  for  it. 

On  September  16th  the  Transvaal  State  Secretary  wrote: 

"This  Government  wi.shes  to  state  that  it  learns  with 
"a  feeling  of  deep  regret  that  it  must  understand  tluit  Her 
"Majesty's  Government  withdraws  from  the  invitation  sent 
"in  your  letter  of  23rd  August,  and  accepted  by  this  Covcrn- 
''tiient.  *  *  "It  cannot  understand  why  (r.s- .v(W/ a.v 
"this  invitation  ivas  accepted  (as  7cas  done  by  this  Govern- 
''nient  in  its  note  2nd  September),  etc.'" 

lint  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  note  of  September  2nd  neither  accepted 
Mr.  Chamberlain's  invitation,  nor  even  remotely  indicated  any  disposition  to 
accept  it.  And  as  if  one  such  examiile  of  duplicit\-  were  not  enough  at  a 
time,  the  State  Secretary  proceeded: 

"The  proposal  which  has  now  lapsed,  contained  in 
"the  letters  of  this  Government  of  19th  August  and  21st 
"August,  'ivas  induced  by  sn^xestions  j>iven  by  Ihitish  Affcnt 
"to  State  Attorney,  and  these  n'cre  accepted  by  this  Govern- 
"mcnt  in  t^ood  faith  and  on  express  request  as  equivalent  to  an 
"assurance  that  the  proposal  ivould  be  acceptable  to  Her  Ma- 
'  festv's  (nrvernment. 

Thus  at  last,  7vhcn  it  suite  I  the   Transvaal  to  try  another  o;ame,  the 
conversations  which  Mr.  Smuts  did  not  intend  sliould  go  to  the  British  Gov- 


32 


THK   TRANvSVAAL   WAR. 


crnment  arc  calUd  "stig^^estions  from  the  liritish  A}^ent  to  Mr.  Smtfts," 
7('/i/'r/i,  if  (onrii,  Mr,  Smut.';' s  iiitc)ifio)is  could  liuir  nothing  •whatever  to 
do  'a'ilh  them. 

On  June  14th,  Mr.  Chamberlain  telegraphed  that  there  had 
appeared  in  new.spapers  a  report,  stated  to  be  on  the  authority  of  Dr. 
Leyds,  that  the  franchise  proposals  were  conditional  upon  the  British 
Government's  acceptance  of  arbitration.  This  being  communicated  to 
the  Transvaal  Government  their  answer  was  that  the  President  "repudi- 
"ated  the  idea  of  any  bargain,  and  expressly  proposed  that  each  subject 
"should  be  treated  on  its  own  merits."  But  later,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
Transvaal  Government  took  up  an  entirely  different  position. 

Again,  on  June  i8th,  the  Transvaal  State  Secretary  wrote  with 
regard  to  the  above  mentioned  newspaper  report,  "With  reference  to 
"telegram  to  Leyds  6th  June,  there  nuist  be  some  mistake,  as  no  such 
"telegram  has  been  sent  by  South  Af.ican  Government."  Five  days 
later  the  State  Secretary  expressed  his  sorrow  at  discovering  that  the  tele- 
gram in  question  had  after  all  been  sent  to  Dr.  Leyds  I !  I 

In  a  writton  proposal  made  by  the  President  at  the  Conference  he 
said,  "Naturalized  citizens  in  the  South  African  Republic  also  have  the 
"right  to  serve  as  jurymen,  and  likewise  to  select  the  local  officials,  such 
"as  field  cornet,  commandant  and  landdrost,  and  they  obtain  thereby  a 
"very  important  influence  on  the  local  Government." 

After  his  return  to  Capetown  Sir  Alfred  Milner  discovered  that 
before  the  Conference  the  appointment  of  landdrosts  on  all  gold  fields 
throughout  the  country  had  been  entirely  taken  arvay,  even  from  full 
burirhers,  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  Government.  The  landdrost  is 
a  Stipendary  Magistrate,  who  administers  justice  and  receives  the  revenue 
of  a  district.  As  Sir  Alfred  Milner  remarked,  the  President's  statement 
was  "mi.sleading  on  a  point  of  importance." 

How  are  we  to  account  for  this  persistent  prevarication  ?  It  cer- 
tainly was  not  likely  to  mislead  the  British  officials;  what  then  was  the 
motive  ?  That  question,  I  think,  can  be  easily  answered.  The  object 
was  to  influence  public  opinion  throughout  the  world;  to  create  a  senti- 
ment in  other  countries  hostile  to  England;  and  to  divide  the  British 
people  themselves.  It  is  practically  impo.ssible  to  keep  before  the  public 
the  facts  of  a  controversy  so  wide,  and  which  has  been  running  for  years; 
but  to  a  man  like  Dr.  Leyds,  who  never  allows  facts  to  stand  in  his  way, 
it  was  not  difficult  to  work  up  the  desired  .sentiment  in  communities  never 
particularly  well  disposed  toward  Great  Britain;  and  in  England  itself 
there  was,  of  course,  the  usual  opposition  to  the  Government,  so  that 
between  half  truths  and  actual  falsehoods  the  nation  was,  until  the  real 
outbreak  of  hostilities,  very  much  divided  in  opinion.  There  were  many 
things  in  favor  of  the  Boers.  Their  numerical  insignificance;  the  dangers 
through  which  they  had  passed  in  the  original  settlement  of  the  Trans- 
vaal; the  stubbornness  with  which  they  had  defended  their  independence; 


THE   TRANSVAAL   WAR. 


33 


all  appealed  strongly  to  the  instincts  of  chivalrous  people.  With  many 
others  their  reputation  for  deep  religious  conviction  doubtless  had  its 
weight.  A  great  power  must  have  a  very  strong  case  to  carry  public 
opinion  with  it  in  a  quarrel  with  a  small  power. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  European  peoples  are  to-day  almost  a 
unit  against  us.  The  most  we  can  hope  for  is  the  neutrality  of  their 
Governments;  but  it  is  by  no  means  inconceivable  that  popular  clamor 
might  push  some  of  them  into  hostilities  against  us,  either  on  behalf  of 
tlie  Transvaal  or  for  their  private  ends.  Certainly  there  is  at  present  no 
public  sentiment  which  would  have  the  effect  of  holding  their  Govern- 
ments back  if  they  were  disposed  to  adopt  such  a  course.  This  is  a  great 
advantage  to  the  Boers,  and  it  supplies  the  motive  we  are  looking  for. 

This  unanimity  of  disapproval  would  be  less  remarkable  if  the 
discontent  in  the  Transvaal  were  confined  to  British  subjects,  which  was 
by  no  means  the  case.  Mr.  Rouliot,  President  of  the  Chamber  of  Mines 
at  Johannesburg,  a  Frenchman,  said: 

"We  are  the  most  heavily  taxed  community  in  the 

"world,  although  we  are  the  one  that  has  the  least  to  say 

"about  the  funds  it  contributes." 

Among  the  64  m^nnbers  of  the  Reform  Committee  at  Johannesburg 
who  were  arrested  after  the  rising  there  in  1896  there  were  six  Americans, 
one  Hollander,  one  Bavarian,  one  German,  one  Swiss  and  one  Turk,  and 
of  the  four  of  these  who  were  condemned  to  death,  (the  others  all  being 
sentenced  to  imprisonment),  one  was  a  prominent  American,  Mr.  John 
Hays  Hammond. 

Such  effrontery  of  falsehood  perhaps  never  entered  into  interna- 
tional negotiations  before.  It  would  be  incredible  were  the  proofs  not 
found  in  the  official  documents. 

Not  without  good  reason  did  Sir  Alfred  Miliier  once  write  to  Mr. 

Chamberlain: 

"The  way  in  which  the  State  Secretary  juggles  with 

"the  Convention  of  1884  is  rather  irritating  to  a  plain  man." 

At  Bloemfontein  President  Kruger  insisted  that  he  would  have  the 
greatest  difficulty  as  to  any  franchise  reforms  with  the  \'olksraad  and  his 
burghers,  and  that  there  would  be  no  prospect  of  getting  a  measure 
passed  unless  he  could  show  that  substantial  concessions  in  other  direc- 
tions had  l)eeu  made  to  the  Transvaal  by  Great  Britain. 

But  when,  for  effect,  he  rushed  a  more  liberal  measure  through  the 
Volksraad,  the  burgliers  were  not  consulted,  and  the  President  could  not 
he  induced  to  wait  long  cnnu.i^h  for  the  British  Government  to  satisfy 
itself  whetlier  the  proposed  law  would  remove  the  difficulty. 

Everything  done  by  the  Transvaal  in  this  connection  bears  the 
impress  of  insincerity;  and  if  more  were  needed  to  show  that  they  never 
intended  to  offer  the  Uitlanders  any  acceptable  franchise  it  is  to  be  found 
in  the  statement  of  Dr.  Leyds,  now  European  Agent  of  the  Transvaal, 
(The  North  American  Review,  Jan.,  1900): 


34 


THE  TRANSVAAL   WAR. 


"And  every  impartial  and  fair  mind  will  understand 
"that /'/  rc'^s  impossible  for  the  South  African  Republic  to  grant 
"political  rights  to  foreigners.  Why,  the  franchise  in  the 
"Transvaal  was  denied  to  friendly  foreigners  of  our  own  race 
" — to  the  citizens  of  the  Orange  Free  State.  Why  should 
"we  have  granted  it  to  Englishmen?  " 

Tlie  answer  to  Dr.  Eeyds'  question  is  another.  If  it  were  impos- 
sible to  grant  political  rights  to  foreigners  xvhy  did  not  President  Kruger  at 
once  say  so  at  Bloemfontcin  ;  why  did  the  \'olksraad  pass  a  law  pretending 
to  give  the  franchise  to  foreigners  ;  why,  later  on,  did  Kruger  offer  them 
still  fuller  political  rights,  although  upon  conditions  which  he  knew 
Great  Britain  would  never  accept  ?  Will  Dr.  Leyds  tell  us  what  it  is  we 
hear  so  much  about  from  his  friends  and  our  enemies  of  a  great  conces- 
sion offered  bj-  Kruger  and  refused?  Will  Dr.  Leyds  further  explain 
why  he  himself,  a  Hollander,  was  admitted  to  citizenship,  while  another 
Hollander  was  cast  into  prison  for  asking  to  be  enfranchised  ? 

And,  at  last,  the  Government  which  had  been  stubbornly  im- 
movable for  years — which  the  British  Commissioner  found  it  impossible 
to  make  headway  with  on  any  point— became  most  impatient  to  know 
what  proposals  Mr.  Chamberlain  would  submit  in  place  of  those  which 
the  Transvaal  liad  unceremoniously  withdrawn.  They  were  told  that 
they  were  being  prepared  and  would  be  presented  as  soon  as  possible;  but 
they  could  not  wait.  They  expressed  great  surprise  that  there  should  be 
any  delay  in  .so  .simple  a  matter — so  simple  that  five  days'  personal  discus- 
sion between  Pre.sident  Kruger  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner  on  one  of  the  many 
differences  between  the  two  countries  had  been  absolutely  without  result. 
They  pretended  to  believe  that  England  was  gaining  time  for  military 
preparations,  although  they  were  by  no  means  neglecting  that  sort  of 
thing  themselves;  and  finally,  as  you  know,  they  presented  an  ultimatum 
which  left  no  alternative  but  war. 

The  ultimatum  was  dated  just  fourteen  days  after  Mr.  Chamberlain 
had  announced  his  intention  to  make  suggestions  for  the  .settlement  of 
every  existing  difference  between  the  two  Governments,  which  interval 
was  declared  to  be  evidence  of  deliljerate  procrastination'  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Chamberlain.  Yet,  when  Mr.  Chamberlain's  request  for  a  joint 
enquiry  into  the  franchise  then  offered  was  laid  before  the  Boer  Govern- 
ment, ten  days  elapsed  ivithout  the  slightest  sign  of  any  reply,  and  when 
the  answer  came  it  was  not  a  definite  one,  but  a  counter  proposition.  // 
would  be  instructive  if  ice  could  apply  the  Rule  of  Three  to  these  tivo periods, 
and  the  weight incss  of  the  problems  respectively  under  consideration. 

It  really  looks  as  though  the  Boers  never  intended  to  tell  the  truth 
or  to  keep  any  promise  they  made. 

Article  IV.  of  the  Convention  of  1884  reads  : 

"The  South  African  Republic  will  conclude  no  treaty 

"or  engagement  with  any  State  or  nation  other  than  the 


THE  TRANSVAAI.  WAR. 


35 


"Orange  Free  State,  nor  with  any  native  tribe  to  the  east- 
"ward  or  westward  of  the  Republic,  until  the  same  has  been 
'  'approved  by  Her  Majesty,  the  Queen. 

"Such  approval  shall  be  considered  to  have  been 
"granted  if  Her  Majesty's  Government  shall  not,  within  six 
"months  after  receiving  a  copy  of  such  treaty,  have  notified 
"that  the  conclusion  of  such  treaty  is  in  conflict  with  the 
"interests  of  Great  Britain  or  of  any  of  Her  Majesty's  pos- 
"sessions  in  South  Africa." 

Clearly,  then,  unless  the  British  Government  gave  their  decision 
sooner,  six  months  must  elapse  after  a  treaty  was  made  before  it  could  go 
into  eflfect. 

But  what  did  the  Boers  do  ?  The  Convention  was  ratified  by  the 
Volksraad  August  8,  1884,  and  by  September  i6th  following  the  Boers 
had  made  a  treaty  with  natives  and  the  President  had  issued  a  proclama- 
tion upon  the  strength  thereof.  On  May  9th,  1899,  the  Transvaal  State 
Secretary  attempted  to  justify  this  action  in  the  following  remarkable 

language : 

'  'That  Article  gave  the  right  to  conclude  treaties  with 

"any  native  race  to  the  east  or  west  of  the  Republic,  subject 

"to  the  assetit  of  Her  Majesty,  and  when  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 

"ernment  raised  objection  to  the  approval  of  that  agreement 

" the  proclauiation  teas  withdraivnP 

To    suppose  for   a  moment  that  these    cunning   Boers   did  not 

appreciate  the  great  difference  between  previous  assent  and   subsequent 

objection  would  be  preposterous. 

At   the    Bloemfontein    Conference    President   Kruger    asked    Sir 

Alfred  Mihier  the  meaning  of  England's  military  preparations  in  South 

Africa,  in  reply  to  which  Sir  Alfred  said  that  they  appeared  insignificant 

by  comparison   with    those    of  the  Transvaal.     The    crafty    Kruger's 

answer  was  as  follows: 

"It  pleases  me  very  much  to  hear  what  His  Excel- 
"lency  said,  but  I  would  like  to  give  him  a  correct  idea 
"with  regard  to  his  statement  that  the  Afrikanders  are 
"being  armed.  Your  Excellency  knows  that  when  the 
"State  was  first  founded  the  Afrikanders  were  always 
"armed,  but  that  they  gradually  became  neglectful  therein, 
"and  when  a  commando  had  to  be  called  up  against  the 
"Kaffirs  we  found  very  many  were  not  armed,  while  many 
"of  those  who  had  arms  had  old  guns,  and  you  can  easily 
"imagine  that  when  one  was  served  with  a  new  gun  they 
"all  wanted  one." 
And  no'W  they  boast  that  they  have  /our  good  guns  for  every  man, 

and  of  how  cleverlv  they  got  them  into  the  country,  with  plenty  of  the  Jinest 

artillery  in  the  world,  without  our  finding  it  ant. 


36 


THE  TRANSVAAIv  WAR. 


Look  at  the  ultimatum.  Consider  its  suddenness,  its  studied  inso- 
lence of  tone  and  terms,  its  urgency.  A  demand  such  as  no  great  power 
ever  made  upon  another,  couched  in  language  the  contemptuous  character 
of  which  it  would  be  impossible  to  exaggerate,  was  presented  without  the 
slightest  premonition,  and  while  Mr.  Chamberlain's  new  proposals  were 
being  formulated.  What  is  the  use  of  talking  about  who  provoked  the 
war !  The  Boers  knew  well  enough  that  their  ultimatum  left  England 
no  possible  alternative.  Nothing  had  happened,  nothing  was  going  to 
happen,  to  make  such  a  precipitate  movement  necessary.  The  British 
troops  were  very  few  and  well  within  their  own  boundaries ;  they 
had  even  refrained  from  occupying  the  strong  mountain  position  of 
Laing's  Nek,  near  by  and  on  British  soil.  No  considerable  reinforce- 
ments were  immediately  due  in  South  Africa.  If  the  object  of  the  Boers 
was  defence  they  would  still  for  weeks  to  come  have  been  vastly 
stronger  than  the  British  ;  if  they  wanted  to  attack,  the  sooner  they  did  it 
the  better. 

At  Bloemfontein  President  Kruger  said: 

"We   have   never  been    the    attacking    party,    but 
"always    defending.     We    follow    out    what     God     says, 
"  'Accursed  be  he  who  removeth  his  neighbor's  landmark,' 
*'and  as  hmj^  as   Youp-  Excellency  lives  you  shall  see  we  will 
*'never  be  the  attacking  party  on  another  vian' s  land.'' 
Pious  and  delightful  old  man  I     Only  five  months  and  a  Jhv  days 
later  his  people,  by  his  orders,  became  the  attacking  party  on  the  Queen's 
dominions,  and  issued  proclamations  annexing  the  portions  overrun! 

Consider  the  claim  made  in  respect  of  the  Jameson  raid.  Mr. 
Chamberlain  promised  that  the  Transvaal  should  be  suitably  indem- 
nified by  the  Chartered  Company,  whose  servants  the  raiders  were. 
The  raid  occurred  at  New  Year,  1896,  the  party  surrendering  four  days 
after  entering  the  country.  In  February,  1897,  after  an  interval  quite 
sufficient  to  allay  the  first  irritation,  the  Transvaal  presented  a  claim 
for  material  damages  amounting  to  /eyy.coo  and  for  moral  damages 
/i,ooo,ooo— in  all,  close  on  $8,200,000. 

These  figures  show  the  unreasonable  temper  of  the  Trans- 
vaal. Granting  that  the  fullest  compensation  should  be  made,  it  is 
an  astounding  estimate  of  the  damages  caused  by  an  expedition  of  only  500 
men  who  surrendered  within  four  days  of  crossing  the  border,  with  a  loss 
to  the  Boer  forces  of  5  killed  and  3  wounded.  Leaving  out  of  account 
altogether  the  fact  that  the  raid  was  brought  about  by  the  intolerable 
treatment  of  the  countrymen  of  the  raiders,  one  has  only  to  compare  this 
claim  with  the  indemnity  exacted  by  Prussia  from  France  to  perceive  its 
utter  absurdity.  What,  we  may  well  ask,  would  the  civilized  nations  .say 
if  when  the  Boers  are  conquered  England  should  demand  from  them  com- 
pensation upon  their  own  scale  ?  If  the  claim  was  formulated  as  part  of 
a  deliberate  purpose  to  aggravate  the  situation  it  would  be  intelligible; 
it  seems  to  me  incomprehensible  upon  any  other  hypothesis. 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


37 


WHAT  CAN  BE  SAID  FOR  THE  BOERS? 

I  have  tried  to  find  the  very  best  things  said  about  them  by  their 
own  friends.  I  take  first  their  New  York  champion,  Mr.  Geo.  W.  Van 
Siclen,  who  has  been  very  much  in  evidence  in  the  Press. 

He  says  that  the  Boers  did  not  agree  by  the  Conventions  of  1881 
and  1884  to  admit  foreigners  to  any  political  rights.  I  wonder  whether 
he  expects  the  free  American  people  to  consider  that  a  good  reason  why 
a  Government  caUing  itself  a  Republic  should  deny  to  worthy  foreigners 
reasonable  opportunities  for  obtaining  citizenship.  He  says  that  foreign- 
ers have  no  voice  in  the  affairs  of  the  United  States;  but  he  omits  to  say 
that  those  who  so  desire  may  cease  to  be  foreigners  upon  very  easy  terms, 
and  that  they  have  long  been  encouraged  so  to  do. 

Astounding  as  it  may  seem,  the  above  epitomizes  all  that  Mr.  Van 
Siclen  is  able  to  advance  in  justification  of  the  Boers.  He  indulges  in  a 
great  deal  of  abuse  of  England,  but  he  advances  nothing  to  show  that  the 
Transvaal  gave  the  Uitlanders  equitable  laws,  impartially  administered, 
and  those  rights  which  free  men  will  always  demand,  wherever  they 
may  be. 

Mr.  James  Bryce,  who  from  his  present  attitude  might  be  assumed 
to  find  much  good  in  the  Boers  and  their  Government,  wrote  of  them 
thus  more  than  two  years  since: 

'  'Severed  from  Europe  and  its  influence  two  hundred 
"years  ago,  they  have  in  some  of  the  elements  of  modern 
"civilization  gone  back  rather  than  forward.  *  *  * 
"They  are  strangely  ignorant  and  backward  in  all  their 
"ideas.  They  have  no  literature  and  very  few  newspapers. 
"*  :i=  *  They  dislike  and  despise  the  Kaffirs, 
"whom  they  have  regarded  as  Israel  may  have  regarded  the 
"Amalekites,  and  whom  they  have  treated  with  equal  sever- 
"ity.  *  *  *  They  know  little  or  nothing  of 
"the  modern  world  or  of  international  politics,  *  *  * 
"They  have  a  double  measure  of  wariness  and  wiliness  in 
"their  intercourse  with  strangers  because  their  habitual  sus- 
"picion  makes  them  seek  in  craft  the  defense  for  their  igno- 
"rance  of  affairs. 

"Both  legislation  and  administration  have  been  car- 
"ried  on  in  a  rough-and-ready  fashion,  sometimes  in  viola- 
"lation  of  the  strict  letter  of  the  law,  and  the  provision  of 
"the  Grondwet  (Constitution),  that  no  law  should  be 
"enacted  without  being  submitted  for  a  period  of  three 
"mc-^hs  to  the  people,  has  been  practically  ignored.  *  * 
"As  late  as  1 881,  an  immigrant  could  acquire  the  right  of 
"electoral  franchise  after  two  years.     lu  1882  this  period 


38 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


"was  raised  to  five  years,  and  in  1887  to  fifteen.  *  *  ♦ 
"The  effect  of  the  legislation  of  1890  and  subsequent  years 
"down  to  1894  has  been  to  debar  any  immigrant  from 
'  'acquiring  the  right  to  vote  for  the  First  Volksraad  until  he 
"has  passed  the  age  of  forty  and  resided  for  at  least  twelve 
"years  in  the  country  after  taking  the  oath.  *  ;|c  * 
"President  Kruger  hated  all  foreigners  and  foreign  ways, 
"seeing  in  them  the  ruin  of  the  ancient  customs  of  his  peo- 
"ple.  *         *        *        AH  sorts  of  abuses  sprang  up, 

"while  the  primary  duties  of  a  Government  were  very 
"imperfectly  performed.  *  *  :t;  When  100,000 
"white  immigrants  were  congregated  along  the  Witwater- 
"srand,  and  were  employing  some  60,000  native  work 
"people,  an  efficient  police,  an  abundant  water  supply,  good 
"sanitary  regulations  and  laws  to  keep  liquor  from  the 
"natives  became  urgently  needed;  and  none  of  these  things 
"were  provided,  although  taxation  continued  to  rise  and  the 
'  'Treasury  was  overflowing. 

"All  the  Uitlanders  had  substantial  grievances  to 
"redress.  Food  was  inordinately  dear.  *  *  *  Water 
"supply,  police,  sanitation  were  all  neglected.  *  *  * 
"There  was  also  much  opposition  among  the  legal  profes- 
"sion,  Dutch  as  well  as  English,  for  attacks  had  been  made 
"upon  the  independence  of  the  judiciary,  and  the  reckless 
'  'conduct  of  legislation  gave  displeasure. ' ' 

I  cheerfully  rest  my  case  against  the  Boer  Government  upon  this 
description  of  it  by  Mr.  Bryce.  Is  there  any  man  who  knows  what 
freedom  and  justice  and  progress  mean,  who  could  be  content  to  live 
under  such  a  government ;  to  have  the  laws  to  which  he  must  submit 
made  and  administered  by  such  people? 

I  am  often  asked  by  my  American  friends  why  it  is,  if  England  is 
right,  that  Mr.  Bryce,  one  of  ourselves,  (who  is  accepted  in  the  United 
States  as  an  able  and  impartial  historian),  declares  the  war  to  be  an  unju.st 
one  provoked  by  Great  Britain.  I  see  the  difficulty  and  deplore  it;  but  I 
cannot  pretend  to  offer  an  explanation.  I  can  only  reply  that  there  are 
three  things  I  am  entirely  unable  to  understand.  The  first  is  that  any  one 
who  has  carefully  looked  into  the  facts,  (which,  both  as  a  member  of  the 
British  Parliament  and  as  a  writer  on  the  subject,  Mr.  Bryce  was  in  duty 
bound  to  do),  can  justify  the  Boers;  the  second  is  that  any  man  with  the 
slightest  pretensions  to  patriotism  should,  after  the  die  has  been  cast,  de- 
liberately throw  his  voice  and  his  influence  on  the  side  of  the  enemies  of 

his  country  ;  the  third  is  bow  Mr.  Bryce  reconciles  his  former  with  his 
present  utterances. 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


39 


WHAT  CAN  BE  SAID  FOR  ENGLAND  ? 

The  position  taken  by  the  British  Government  has  been  grossly 
misrepresented  in  the  press,  and,  I  fear,  often  deUberately.  But  whether 
or  not  the  result  is  the  same. 

Of  such  ridiculous  charges  as  that  England  planned  to  acquire  the 
Transvaal  because  of  the  gold  fields  no  serious  minded  person  need  take 
notice.     Mr.  Chamberlain  disposed  of  that  theory  in  these  words: 
"lean  hardly  find  patience  to  answer  a  slander  so 
"wicked  and  so  stupid.     These  gentlemen — what  do  they 
•  'know  of  England  ?     What  do  they  know  of  that  great  Col- 
"onial  system  which  now  for  many  years  has  precluded  us 
"from  making  any  pecuniary  gain  from  the  possessions  of 
"the  British  Crown,  from  our  fellow-subjects  in  our  colonies 
"and  dependencies? 

"We  ask  no  ransom;  we  exact  no  tribute;  we  have 
"nothing  directly  to  gain  by  a  war  which  will  transfer  to  us 
'  'a  territory  not  at  present  ours. 

"And  these  critics  of  ours,  what  do  they  know  of 
"England  ?  What  do  they  know  of  the  principles  that  gov- 
"ern  our  action  if  they  think  that  there  exists  among  us 
"any  Government  or  any  Minister  so  base  as  to  carry  into 
"their  country  an  unjust  and  unnecessary  war  for  some 
"personal  or  even  for  some  national  interest?  What  do 
"they  know  if  they  are  not  aware  that  the  generous  instincts 
"of  the  whole  people  would  intervene  to  frustrate  hisneiari- 
"ous  designs,  and  send  him  skulking  into  obscurity,  dis- 
"credited  and  dishonored  by  such  a  policy?" 

It  is  said  that  England  claimed  the  right  to  dictate  to  the  Boers  that 
they  should  grant  the  franchise  to  the  Outlanders,  and  what  sort  of  fran- 
chise it  should  be.  Nothing  could  be  more  untrue.  There  is  not  a  word 
in  the  despatches  or  the  proceedings  at  Bloemfontein  to  warrant  such  a 
statement. 

England,  it  is  true,  pleaded  with  the  Transvaal  to  enfranchise  the 
deserving  Outlanders,  as  an  act  of  justice,  in  the  interest  of  peace,  for 
the  good  of  the  Transvaal  itself;  but  her  only  demand  ivas  that  before  bid- 
ding her  devoted  subjects  depart  she  should  be  satisfied  that  their  cries  for 
bread  would  not  be  answered  xvith  a  stone. 

Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner  are  accused  of  adopting  a 
bullying  tone  toward  the  Boers.  I  detect  nothing  of  the  kind  in  the 
despatches  or  the  discussion  at  Bloemfontein.  On  the  contrary  the  lang- 
uage of  England's  representatives  was  singularly  forbearing  under  great 
provocation. 

Listen  again  to  Mr.  Bryce,  one  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  bitterest 
opponents.     More  than  two  years  ago  he  wrote: — 


40 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


"Why  did  not  President  Kruger  bow  to  the  storm 
"and  avert  revolt  by  reasonal)le  concessions?  He  had  not 
"a  friend  in  the  world  except  Germany.  *  ♦  *  Both 
"the  Free  State  and  the  Cape  Boers  had  been  alienated  by 
"the  hostile  tariff  which  the  President  had  set  up  against 
"their  food  stuffs,  and  by  his  refusal  to  employ  Cape  Dutch- 
"men  in  the  Transvaal  service.  *  *  *  Had  he  ex- 
"tended  the  franchise  to  all  immigrants,  after  say  five 
"years'  residence,  he  might  not  only  have  disarmed  opposi- 
"tion,  but  have  made  the  South  African  Republic  a 
'  'powerful  .State,  no  considerable  section  of  whose  inhabi- 
'  'tants  would  thereafter  have  thought  of  putting  themselves 
"under  the  British  crown.' 

That  is  precisely  what  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner 
begged  Kruger  to  do;  precisely  what  they  said  the  .  :     It  would  be. 

Mr.  Geo.  W.  Van  Siclen,  who  has  been  flooding  the  American 
papers  with  appeals  for  sympathy  for  the  Boers,  makes  the  grossest  mis- 
statements. In  an  article  published  in  Thk  Outlook  of  October  21st 
last,  he  said: 

"England  says,  'You  shall  receive  as  citizens  those 
"  'whom  the  British  Empire  chooses  to  force  upon  you'  *  *  * 
"We  have  as  much  reason  to  anticipate  and  to  yield  to  a 
"demand  that  every  Englishman  residing  in  the  United 
'  'States  shall  be  accorded  the  right  of  franchise  xvithout  taking 
"■'the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States." 

Look  again  at  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  proposals,  and  ask  whether 
Mr.  Van  Siclen  was   himself  deceived  or  trying  to  deceive  his  readers. 

As  a  further  example  of  Mr.  Van  Siclen's  lack  of  information,  or 
lack  of  veracity,  (it  is  not  for  me  to  say  which),  he  in  the  same  article 
makes  this  statement: — 

"  This  treaty  of  iSSr  xcasnot  ratified  by  the  Congress  of 

^'thc  South  African  Republic;  they  refused  to  admit  that 

".suzerainty  and  sent  a  commission  to  London  refusing  to 

"submit  to  this  claim   of  suzerainty,    and  it  was  stricken 

"from  the  treaty." 

Well,  it  so  happens  that  the  Convention  of  188 1  7vas  ratified  by  the 
Volksraad  on  October  25th,  1881;  it  happens  that  by  its  express  terms  it 
would  have  been  void  if  not  so  ratified,  in  which  event  there  would  have 
been  no  Transvaal  independence  at  all.  How  does  it  happen  that  Mr. 
Van  Siclen  dared  to  obtrude  so  much  ignorance  or  so  much  falsehood  upon 
the  people  of  the  United  States* 

This  is  the  sort  of  thing  which  accounts  for  the  false  impre.ssions 
so  prevalent  among  our  neighbors,  with  the  result  that  public  opinion  is 
argely  against  us  when  it  ought  to  be  all  vnih  us. 


THE   TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


4« 


On  which  side  do  we  find  the  conciliation  which  shows  the  desire 
for  peace  ?  Beginning  with  the  restoration  of  Transvaal  independence, 
after  Great  Britain  had  suffered  several  humiliating  defeats  in  petty  en- 
gagements, and  at  the  moment  when  she  was  at  last  in  a  position  to 
avenge  them,  we  have  following  in  quick  succession  the  enlargement  of 
Transvaal  territory  and  the  reduction  in  England's  privileges  by  the  Con- 
vention of  1884;  again  a  further  addition  of  territory,  although  by  the 
last  Convention  the  Boers  had  agreed  to  be  content  with  the  boundaries 
then  laid  down;  and  repeated  breaches  of  the  Convention  by  the  Boers, 
and  years  of  injustice  to  British  subjects  patiently  endured  by  their  Gov- 
ernment. These  constitute  a  considerable  manifestation  of  peaceful  pur- 
poses on  the  one  side;  what  is  there  on  the  other?  I  can  find  nothing.  I 
cannot  even  discover  that  the  Boers  or  their  friends  claim  that  they  did 
anything  to  demonstrate  a  like  purpose  on  their  part,  except  the  hollow 
offers  of  franchise  in  the  last  few  months.  All  their  ni  t  vehement 
champions  can  advance  is  that  the  Boers  did  not  wrong  ii  Outlanders, 
beiansc  tlie  Outlanders  were  entitled  to  nothing. 

The  Boers  and  their  friends  say  "England  was  preparing  for  war." 
And  why  should  she  not  ?  With  the  Transvaal  armed  to  the  teeth,  with 
munitions  of  war  pouring  in  every  day,  what  would  they  have  had  us  do? 
Our  possible  antagonist  was  already  fully  prepared.  Since  when 
has  it  been  inconsistent  with  pacific  designs  to  take  reasonable  precautions 
against  obvious  danger? 

Mr.  Bryce  complains  that  England  was  not  sufficiently  patient  with 
these  tyrant  tricksters.  He  tells  the  oppressed  and  despised  Outlanders 
that  Kruger  must  die  some  day  and  they  should  have  waited  for  his  demise, 
because  it  is  unlikely  that  another  such  despot  would  succeed  him.  This, 
truly,  is  a  novel  doctrine  for  free-born  Englishmen  !  And  mean- 
time British  subjects  would  be  dying,  as  for  years  other  British  subjects 
had  died,  fearing  that  the  proudest  tradition  of  British  citizenship  had 
been  belied;  that  at  last  the  ears  of  the  motherland  were  deaf  to  her  child- 
ren's cries. 

Patience,  forsooth!  With  whom?  Is  it  this  autocrat  Kruger; 
the  glib  quoter  of  Scripture  ;  the  chief  agent  in  stirring  up  the  bloodshed 
of  1881  ?  How  much  patience  did  he  show  toward  us  then?  There  was 
no  oppression  of  the  Boers  by  England;  their  lives  and  property  and 
liberties  were  safe  ;  bankruptcy  had  given  place  to  prosperity  ;  the  Zulu 
horde  which  threatened  their  destruction  had  itself  been  crushed  by 
British  money  and  British  blood.  But,  they  say,  the  promised  Constitu- 
tion had  been  delayed ;  some  English  officials  were  unwisely  arrogant 
and  peremptory  ;  and  for  these  small  sins  Kruger  turned  his  rifles  upon 
the  men  who  four  short  years  before  had  rescued  his  country  from 
financial  ruin  and  its  people  from  massacre! 

And  what  of  Mr.  Chamberlain,  who  has  been  accused  of  forcing 
on  this  war  to  gratify  his  personal  ambition ;  who,  contrary  to  every 


4a 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


principle  of  British  justice,  is  assumed  by  his  critics  to  have  connived  at 
the  Jameson  raid,  of  which  there  is  not  an  atom  of  proof — who  is  charged 
with  wanting  war  when  he  was  pretending  to  want  peace.  Fortunately 
Mr.  Chamberlain's  part  in  this  business  is  on  record  in  the  despatches. 
This  is  from  Thb  Nation  (New  York),  after  the  Ultimatum  : 

"It  was  made  plain,  in  every  way  that  words  could 
"make  it  plain,  that  England  asked  only  a  reasonable  fran- 
"chise  and  elementary  political  rights  for  her  subjects  in  the 
"Transvaal.  ♦  *  *  This  wa.^.  what  Sir  Alfred 
"Milner  had  said  would  be  satisfactory.  Mr.  Chamberlain 
"said  at  the  time  that  it  would  be  satisfactory.  *  *  *  l<j 
"there  any  war  in  that — any  intention  to  'wipe  out  the 
"  '  Transvaal?'  *  *  *  it  may  be  asserted— of 
"course  the  Boers  do  assert  it — that  the  English  Govem- 
"mcnt  meant  war.  *  *  *  This  may  be  argued,  as 
"any  motive  may  be  alleged,  but  no  o\-ert  act  by  England 
"has  exceeded  her  undoubted  right  under  international  law. 
"  *  *  *  Every  step  she  has  taken  has  been  law- 
"fuUy  taken,  and  words  of  peace,  with  recognition  of  the 
"independence  of  the  Transvaal,  have  been  constantly  used 
"by  her." 

Every  word  of  that  is  true — the  despatches  prove  it. 
England,  then,  has  talked  peace  and  acted  peace  ;  the  Boers  have 
talked  peace  and  acted  war. 


WHAT  IS  ENGLAND  FIGHTING  FOR? 

Undoubtedly  one  of  the  questions  involved  is  whether  England 
shall  continue  to  shape  the  destinies  and  mould  the  civilization  of  South 
Africa.  In  the  view  of  many  eminent  statesmen  the  fate  of  the  whole 
Empire  is  also  at  stake.  I  will  not  attempt  to  discuss  these  propositions, 
because  the  outcome  of  the  conflict  is  not  a  matter  of  doubt  with  any  con- 
siderable number  of  our  fellow  subjects. 

But  there  is  another  issue  which,  as  I  believe,  we  shall  all  agree 
is  quite  big  enough  to  justify  the  war,  even  if  there  were  no  other,  and  if 
war  had  not  been  forced  upon  us  by  the  invasion  of  our  soil.  That  issue 
is  whether  British  citizenship  shall  continue  to  be  a  valuable  heritage 
or  an  empty  phrase ;  whether  the  Union  Jack  shall  still  be  an  effectual 
protection  or  become  nothing  more  than  a  distinguishing  badge.  If 
Great  Britain  can  no  longer  assure  the  safety  of  her  subjects  beyond  her 
own  borders,  then  the  sad  day  has  come  when  the  British  Empire 
must  cease  to  be.  And,  for  my  part,  though  I  have  no  fears  as  to  the 
result— nor  would  I  have  were  the  task  tenfold  as  heavy— I  would  a 
thousand  times  rather  our  glorious  flag  should  be  lowered  in  the 
struggle  than  that  one  of  its  subjects  should  in  vain  have  appealed  to  it 
for  justice. 


■;l 


THE  TRANSVAAL  WAR. 


43 


It  has  been  worth  something  to  be  a  British  subject.     It  is  worth 
everything,  if  need  be,  to  keep  our  heritage  unimpaired.  How  much  let 
us  learn  from  a  Senator  of  the  United  States,  whose  words  I  repeat : 
"I  think  that  one  of  the  grandest  things  in  all  the 

"history  of  Great  Britain  is  that  she  does  protect  her  sub- 

"jects  everywhere,  anywhere,  and  under  all  circumstances. 

"I  do  not  wonder  that  a  British  subject  loves  his  country. 

"This  little  incident,  with  which  you  are  all  familiar,  is  a 

"marvellous    illustration    of  the  protection    which  Great 

"Britain  gives  to  her  subjects  : 

"The  King  of  Abyssinia  took  a  British  subject 
"named  Cameron,  about  twenty  years  ago,  carried  him  up 
"to  the  fortress  of  Magdala,  on  the  heights  of  a  rocky 
"mountain,  and  put  him  into  a  dungeon  without  cause 
"assigned.  It  took  six  months  for  Great  Britain  to  find 
"that  out.  Then  Great  Britain  demanded  his  immediate 
"release.     King  Theodore  refused  the  release. 

"In  less  than  ten  days  after  that  refusal  was  received 
"ten  thousand  British  soldiers,  including  five  thousand  sepoys, 
"were  on  board  ships  of  war,  and  were  sailing  down  the 
"coast.  When  they  had  disembarked,  they  were  marched 
"across  that  terrible  country,  a  distance  ot  seven  hundred 
"miles,  under  a  burning  sun,  up  the  mountain,  up  to  the 
"very  heights  in  front  of  the  frowning  dungeon,  then  gave 
"battle,  battered  down  the  iron  gates  of  the  stone  walls, 
"reached  down  into  the  dungeon,  and  lifted  out  of  it  that 
"one  British  subject. 

"Then  they  carried  him  down  the  mountain,  across 
"the  land,  put  him  on  board  a  white-winged  ship  and  sped 
"him  to  his  home  in  safety.  That  cost  Great  Britain 
"twenty-five  million  dollars,  and  made  General  Napier  Lord 
"Napier  of  Magdala. 

'  'That  was  a  great  thing  for  a  great  country  to  do — 
"a  country  that  has  an  eye  that  can  see  all  across  the 
"ocean,  all  across  the  land,  away  up  to  the  mountain 
"heights,  and  away  down  to  the  darksome  dungeon,  one 
"subject  of  hers  out  of  her  thirty-eight  millions  of  people, 
"and  then  has  an  arm  strong  enough  and  long  enough  to 
"stretch  across  the  same  ocean,  across  the  same  lands,  up 
"the  same  mountain  heights,  down  to  the  same  dungeon, 
"and  then  lift  him  out  and  carry  him  to  his  own  country 
"and  friends. 

"In  God's  name,  who  would  not  die  for  a  country 
"that  will  do  that  ?" 

Aye,  who  would  not !  The  British  Isles  have  answered  with  an 
alacrity  and  enthusiasm  unmistakable;  the  colonies,  great  and  small,  have 
spoken  with  equal  clearness;  it  seems  to  some  of  us  who  have  had  dreams 
of  Imperial  Federation  that  our  aspirations  are  about  to  be  realized,  and 
that  their  fulfilment  will  be  well  worth  the  cost.  But,  however  that  may 
be,  every  true  British  subject  will  earnestly  desire  the  speedy  and  com- 

plete  triumph  of 

The  Soldiers  of  the  Queen. 


